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Using the Resource-Based Theory To Determine Covenant
Not To Compete Legitimacy
NORMAN D. BISHARA* AND DAVID OROZCO**
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the legitimacy of competing interests involved in the
enforcement of covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). To date, the courts and
legislatures have not relied on a principled theoretical framework to identify and
assess the competing interests between firms and individuals in this setting. This
Article fills the research void by providing a theoretical framework that identifies
the legitimacy of these competing claims. The framework integrates managerial
research involving the resource-based theory of the firm and the knowledge-based
perspective of competitive advantage with the legal analysis and enforcement of
noncompete terms. A descriptive framework of the parties’ competing interests
provides four discrete scenarios, which formalizes the types of legitimate interests a
court must balance when asked to enforce noncompetes. From this descriptive
account, a prescriptive analysis is advocated that uses an ownership approach to
assess the legitimacy of an employer’s claim to knowledge covered by a
noncompete.
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INTRODUCTION
When a product manager at Google told his bosses this year that he was
quitting to take a job at Facebook, they offered him a large raise. When
he said it was not about the money, they told him he could have a
promotion, work in a different area or even start his own company
inside Google.
He turned down all the inducements and joined Google’s newest rival.
“Google’s gotten to be a lot bigger and slower-moving of a company,”
said the former manager, who would speak only on the condition of
anonymity to protect business relationships. “At Facebook, I could see
how quickly I could get things done compared to Google.”1
The stories of the meteoric rise of high-tech companies in Silicon Valley like
Facebook and Google are well known. These companies—and others like Apple,
Inc. (and Microsoft and IBM before them)—are celebrated as the best recent
examples of innovative firms in a new knowledge-economy where a company’s
assets and potential are no longer measured in terms of factories or accounts
receivables, but rather in their potential to continuously grow through new ideas
that spawn marketable innovations.
At the same time, the acceleration of globalization and new technologies “have
undermined [the] long-term employment relationships and brought the market into
the firm in ways that have not previously been experienced.”2 The
employer-employee relationship is now “governed by international labor markets in
a decentralized managerial structure.”3 Moreover, trends such as increased
outsourcing of labor by U.S. firms have had an impact on workers and
organizations that is just beginning to be understood by scholars.4 As one

1. Claire Cain Miller, Google Grows, and Works to Retain Nimble Minds, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2010, at A1 (also finding that “142 of Facebook’s 1,700 employees came from
Google”).
2. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2001).
3. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The
Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 314 (2007)
(citing Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2).
4. See Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Outsourcing and the Changing
Nature of Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 321, 322 (2009) (“Outsourcing changes the nature of
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newspaper article about employee mobility from Google to Facebook put it,
“[m]uch of Silicon Valley’s innovation comes about as engineers leave companies
to start their own.”5
However, the free flow of talented workers between existing firms or to
startups—and thus, the useful knowledge and experience they carry innately into
each new job—cannot be a foregone conclusion in most U.S. jurisdictions. On the
contrary, other high-profile cases demonstrate that the employment contract
provisions known as covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”)6 are used to inhibit
the mobility of former employees and, thus, the knowledge spillovers that result
from employees moving between firms.7 These restrictive covenants have always
created “tension between the reasonableness of the employer’s interest in
maintaining proprietary information and the employee’s need to earn a
livelihood.”8 This tension has been exacerbated by disruptive and fast-moving
technological innovations, such as the internet.9 For instance, noncompete
enforcement or threatened enforcement has been used to attempt to restrict a top
Microsoft manager from going to Google’s China-based operations10 and to stop a
former Time Warner, AOL Internet unit chairman and CEO from joining Yahoo’s
Board of Directors.11 What these examples have in common is that the employer is
attempting to use contractual means to reach beyond the normal default bounds of
the employment relationship and exert control over the postemployment mobility
choices and human capital value of the individual, and to do so in direct
tasks, the design of jobs, and the design of subunits and interunit relationships, thus changing
the experience of employment, including the tasks that individuals perform, whom
individuals interact with when performing their work and the nature and frequency of that
interaction, and the compensation individuals receive for their work.”).
5. Miller, supra note 1, at A1.
6. For purposes of this Article we focus on contract-based postemployment restrictions
on employee behavior, particularly on the former employee’s ability to start a competing
venture or work for a competitor. These sorts of restrictions may be part of a larger
employment agreement as a single clause or may exist as a separate agreement. While other
restrictions are sometimes included in covenants not to compete, such as a restriction on
competition following the sale of a business, this Article is concerned with the role of
noncompetes in restricting the flow and use of knowledge-based assets developed or shared
within the employer-employee relationship.
7. See Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete in a Knowledge Economy:
Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital
Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006).
8. Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact
on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS.
L.J. 301, 323 (2003) (providing a detailed view of the legal implications for employment
relationships in a technology-driven work environment).
9. See id.
10. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, “The Google Challenge”: Enforcement of Noncompete
and Trade Secret Agreements for Employees Working in China, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 603, 606–
14 (2007) (discussing the details of Microsoft Corporation’s claims against Kai-Fu Lee, a
former U.S.-based employee, and Google, Inc., Mr. Lee’s new employer in China).
11. See Miguel Helft & Laurie J. Flynn, Time Warner Blocks a Yahoo Board Choice,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at C3 (despite indications that Time Warner would waive
enforcement of the noncompete, the former employee’s move to Yahoo was effectively
opposed prior to litigation).
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contravention of the employee’s expressed desire for freedom of employment
mobility.
Despite these sorts of instances where a firm’s fortunes are so clearly tied to its
employees’ intellectual capital, there is not a universal approach to these issues in
the law of restrictive covenants. This area of legal doctrine has not evolved to
integrate the new concepts of boundary-less commerce and knowledge assets into
how noncompetes are evaluated by state courts and legislatures. There are, for
example, calls for jurisdictions to follow California’s historical ban on
noncompetes for employees.12 However, the prospect of the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions changing course and embracing a total ban on these restrictive
covenants in the near future seems remote, particularly in light of American courts’
preference for freedom of contract13 and because of the potential utility of
noncompete restrictions to firms that wish to have an additional means to prevent
business knowledge from leaving with a departing employee.14
Yet, if noncompetes are here to stay for the foreseeable future and are
enforceable in most jurisdictions, then the question becomes as follows: how can
courts better interpret and enforce noncompetes to address the issue of knowledge
ownership when employee mobility is concerned? This Article addresses this key
issue in employee-employer contracting and competitive advantage in several
ways. We begin by discussing the competing interests of the stakeholders
implicated in noncompete enforcement. Next, we focus on explaining the nature of
noncompete enforcement and the various policy approaches taken by the states. By
demonstrating the usefulness of conceiving the issue of employee mobility as a
knowledge ownership dispute between employers and employees, we argue that the

12. An example is the recent work of Professor Alan Hyde, who has long been a
proponent of the economic benefits of free employee mobility. See Alan Hyde, Should
Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence Reveals the Economic Harm of NonWinter
2010–2011,
at
6,
available
at
Compete
Covenants,
REG.,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv33n4/regv33n4-2.pdf (adapted from a chapter in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
(Michael Wachter & Cynthia Estlund eds., forthcoming, Edward Elgar, 2011)).
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981)
(“In general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce their agreements
without passing on their substance.”).
14. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 765 (2010) (“The often litigated covenant not
to compete in the employment setting serves two strategic purposes: proprietary protection
and strategic coercion.”). In Professor DiMatteo’s assessment of noncompetes in a strategic
contracting context
The first [reason for seeking noncompete enforcement] relates to the
employer’s proprietary property that has been disclosed to the employee and
that the employer seeks to protect. The second purpose seeks to deter employee
movement to a competitor. The first purpose is best served by drafting a
covenant that is likely to be enforced by the courts. The employer shows that
there is some proprietary interest––trade secrets, know-how, client contacts,
access to key employees, specialized training, databases, and compilations––
that are susceptible to being harmed if used or disclosed to a new employer.
Id.
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traditional reasonableness test for evaluating noncompete enforcement can be
improved and also reenergized. Our proposals are designed to act as an initial
screening mechanism for courts to assess the legitimacy of employer ownership
claims to business knowledge rather than as a wholesale replacement for the
reasonableness test. We conclude the Article by suggesting a framework for courts
to adjudicate this dispute. This framework is based on concepts of human capital
and strategic knowledge assets within a competitive advantage framework known
as the resource-based theory.
Noncompetes and their possible impact have received attention from a broad
range of researchers. For instance, recent articles from a range of disciplines debate
their role, if any, in impacting employee mobility in high-tech regions such as
Silicon Valley in California15 or concentrated industrial regions such as Michigan.16
Additional research has analyzed other business activity phenomena in such areas
as entrepreneurial activity,17 executive compensation,18 and human capital
investment.19 However, little of this growing body of research has focused on
providing a principled legal and strategic justification for when, how, and why the
decision makers—that is, the state courts in conjunction with legislatures—should
evaluate and enforce these important agreements.20 In other words, there is much
discussion of the possible influence of noncompetes on business activity but little
in the way of proposals for how modern courts should address the increasingly
important issue of business-related knowledge as a resource in light of competing

15. See, e.g., Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job Hopping
in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the MicroFoundations of a High–Technology
Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006) (finding greater mobility in the computer sector
of Silicon Valley, California when compared to other California industries or other states
where noncompetes are enforced).
16. See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the
Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (finding evidence of lower
rates of mobility under a policy of noncompete enforcement compared to a previous status
quo of nonenforcement).
17. See Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic
Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003) (using noncompetes
as a variable in assessing the propensity of employees to become entrepreneurs when a
business undergoes dramatic change).
18. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive
Compensation, and Firm Investment, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Nov. 3, 2009, at 1 (finding that
noncompete enforcement in a jurisdiction can negatively impact employee pay and employer
investment).
19. See Bishara, supra note 7 (assessing the benefits and costs of enforcement with
regard to certain classes of workers and arguing that disincentives to invest in workers can
be moderated by policymakers to accentuate positive knowledge spillovers associated with
employee mobility).
20. But see Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics
of Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2012)
(discussing the legal and ethical implications of noncompetes, garden leave, and inevitable
disclosure and recommending that state policy makers and judges consider the business
ethics implications and the justifications of these postemployment restrictions before
allowing enforcement).
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claims to that knowledge. Moreover, the important and rich stream of research on
the role of the resource-based theory that we explore in this Article has only just
begun to influence legal scholarship.21
This Article aims to address these shortcomings in the resource-based theory
research and application by the courts by identifying several competing claims to
the knowledge resource, which can accrue to employers, employees, and the public.
In effect, this Article acknowledges that noncompetes have a legitimate role in
ensuring the fair and appropriate allocation of knowledge ownership rights in
pursuit of sustainable competitive advantage. However, we also argue that the
current approach to noncompete enforcement is inadequate—and perhaps even
harmful—to achieving that goal. The legitimacy of these claims is not currently
part of the systematic decision-making analysis of courts,22 nor is it apparent that
legislatures have formalized the concept of knowledge ownership when articulating
human capital law and policy related to noncompete enforcement. These
policymakers have, thus, ignored questions of knowledge ownership when deciding
the validity of noncompetes, even as these contracts have become fixtures of the
employee-employer relationship23 and as their use may be increasing.24 Moreover,
this trend toward the greater use of noncompetes is occurring when the knowledgebased competitive advantage is increasingly at the core of many U.S. businesses

21. While the resource-based view was initially confined to the management literature,
it has become more widely appreciated as a tool for understanding the strategic business uses
of law and has been applied to specific legal topics. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, What's
Law Got To Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587 (2010);
Rangamohan V. Eunni, Competing in Emerging Markets: The Search for a New Paradigm,
31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 611 (2009) (applying the resource-based view in the context of
small and medium enterprises); Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation and Corporate
Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449 (2001); David B. Lipsky &
Ariel C. Avgar, Toward a Strategic Theory of Workplace Conflict Management, 24 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 143 (2008); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, Anti-Trust—What
Role For Strategic Management Expertise?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2010); David Orozco,
Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687
(2010); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
1 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Ehlers, 915 N.E.2d 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(stating that Illinois does not require employers to prove a legitimate business interest in
cases involving noncompetes).
23. Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (stating that noncompetes “are an
increasingly common feature of employment”). This sentiment is widely shared by several
academic commentators. However, there is very sparse empirical support for this
assumption.
24. See, e.g., Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483 (1990) (finding an increase in appellate decisions
concerning noncompetes, although not directly measuring the use of noncompetes). But see
Schwab & Thomas, infra note 28; infra text accompanying note 28 (evaluating the contracts
of top executives at publically traded U.S. companies).
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and, simultaneously, when geographic boundaries are becoming less important to
economic activity.25
To address this void, this Article presents an operational framework that
identifies the legitimacy of these competing claims and ultimately provides
guidance for policymakers and courts on how to improve evaluations of
noncompete enforcement requests. In Part I, we discuss knowledge development
and ownership in the context of noncompetes and present the competing interests
of the stakeholders involved: employers, employees, and the public. Part II
discusses the current state of how noncompetes are evaluated by the courts, as well
as the drawbacks of this outdated approach, which lacks a coherent strategy to
efficiently resolve disputes over knowledge ownership. Part III introduces the
concepts of the resource-based theory of competitive advantage and utilizes this
theory as a descriptive framework to assess the legitimacy of competing claims to
noncompete enforcement. Part IV expands the application of the resource-based
theory to noncompetes using a prescriptive, unified decision-making framework for
courts to fairly balance the competing interests among all the stakeholders. We
conclude the Article by summarizing our recommendations and calling for courts to
use the proposed framework.
I. THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE NONCOMPETE
ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
In line with the central assertion of this Article—that the resource-based theory
adds value and insight into the question of when and why noncompetes should be
enforced—this Part first presents a brief overview of the typical life cycle of a
covenant not to compete, from inception to litigation. Next, the Part provides a
stakeholder-centric view of the interests of the parties to a noncompete agreement,
as well as the public policy interests at stake.
A. Background of Noncompete Formation and Enforcement
It is often assumed (and often stated) that covenants not to compete are widely
used across industries and throughout the United States where they are permitted,
that they have been increasingly used in the last decades,26 and that they are used

25. See, e.g., E. Lee Reichert, Mergers and Acquisitions in Cyberspace: Navigating the
Black Holes, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 6 (2005) (advising that “the traditional rules of
interpretation might not apply to companies operating in cyberspace” and concluding that
“[b]ecause of the rapidly changing nature of the technology and the ability of the Internet to
reach any jurisdiction from any location, courts have shown a willingness to apply different
rules to cyberspace employees with regard to the geographic, time, and prohibited activity
limitations.”).
26. Bishara, supra note 7, at 289; see also Frank J. Cavico, “Extraordinary or
Specialized Training” as a “Legitimate Business Interest” in Restrictive Covenant
Employment Law: Florida and National Perspectives, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 53, 107
(2001) (“Clearly, restrictive employment covenants may be necessary in today’s fluid, hightech, entrepreneurial business environment, and it appears that they are not only here to stay,
but also to proliferate . . . .”).
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for various types of employees, not for just top talent or those with access to
confidential information.27 While there are no central repositories for noncompetes,
or even much research leading to conclusive numbers on the systematic use and
details of noncompetes in the United States,28 these assumptions seem to be widely
shared by researchers, businesses, and policymakers.29
A request from an employer for an employee to sign a noncompete comes at one
of three junctions in the employment relationship: before the start of employment
as a prerequisite to a job; at the start of the employment (for instance, during an
employee orientation period); or sometime after employment begins (including,
perhaps, right before the employee leaves and the employer exerts one final attempt
at leverage), but obviously before the employment ceases by the election of either
party.30 One issue with the timing of the request to execute a noncompete concerns
the traditional contract requirement that the parties fulfill the element of sufficient
consideration to support the agreement.31 If the contract is signed prior to the start
of employment, it is generally clear that the employer’s consideration is the
promise to hire.32
Controversy more often arises when an employer requests a noncompete after
employment has begun, often as an afterthought or because the employer wants to
promote the employee or expose her to new confidential information. If the
employee is offered some tangible benefit such as a promotion or salary increase in
exchange for the contract, the element of consideration is satisfied.33 However,

27. Bishara, supra note 7, at 290 n.6; supra text accompanying note 7.
28. One exception is a study of executive employment packages at publically traded
companies, which found extensive use of noncompetes, where permitted, in the SEC filings
where the executive contracts were disclosed. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas,
An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain
For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 254–57 (2006). Katherine Stone has also shown that
there has been rise in reported noncompete litigation. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge
at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34
CONN. L. REV. 721, 738–39 (2002) (“Covenants not to compete and covenants not to
disclose information have become commonplace in employment contracts over the past ten
years.”).
29. While the use of noncompetes is hard to measure, the importance of knowledge
assets to firms is clear, and the use of noncompetes in the courts to enforce knowledge
ownership appears to be growing, as is the case with trade secret litigation in the federal
courts. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E.
McCollum & Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2010) (finding that federal trade secret litigation has
experienced exponential growth in the last decades).
30. See COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY xvii (Brian M.
Malsberger ed., 2008 and cum. supp. 2009) (listing the employment relationship time
periods that courts evaluate to determine whether there is sufficient consideration to support
the noncompete contract under the state’s policy).
31. See id. at 3a, 3b, and 3c (addressing, on a state-by-state basis, what is deemed
sufficient consideration to support the agreement).
32. See id. at 3a.
33. For a discussion of the issue of adequate consideration in support of noncompete
contracts, see Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements When
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sometimes the noncompete is requested merely as a requirement of continued
employment.34 Whether continued employment alone is legally sufficient
consideration to support a noncompete after employment has begun varies by
jurisdiction.35
The exact terms of covenants not to compete will vary widely based on obvious
factors such as the individualized relationship of the parties and their respective
bargaining powers, the predictability of enforcement, and the interests that the
employer is trying to protect. The unifying element is that once the employment is
ended (by either party and under any circumstances in some cases) the employee is,
in theory, not allowed to compete against the former employer.36 This prohibited
competition could come from either the entrepreneurial route, where the former
employee starts a competing business, or the competition route, where that
employee simply goes to work for an existing competitor.37
Professor Katherine Stone has formalized this tension in what she calls the
“New Psychological Contract” in the American workplace, where the traditional
promise of long-term employment in exchange for employee dedication to a single
employer is gone.38 As an advocate for employee empowerment within this shifting
employment dynamic, Professor Stone has focused attention on the issue of
legitimate employer interests.39 She first notes that, traditionally, an employer
seeking to restrict the transfer of knowledge would have to assert its interest in a
trade secret or in confidential information.40 She goes on to discuss how two
protectable interests now recognized by the courts—contact with customers and
employer-provided training—are in tension with the new psychological contract of
employment because these demands on employees are not matched by some
commitment on the part of the employer.41
There are, however, ways in which the legitimacy of a contractual constraint can
be questioned. For instance, one commentator has identified a risk of “strategic
coercion” when noncompetes are used even when known to be unenforceable.42
This chilling effect has a purely impermissible, noncompetitive goal that will not be
endorsed by the courts. There are other situations where employers, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, overreach and extract expansive terms. In these
cases the actual goal of the restriction may be permissible (i.e., to protect a
Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95, 101–08
(1998).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Bishara, supra note 7, at 294 (“Noncompete agreements are a popular
contractual tool used by employers to restrict an employee's post-employment ability to
work for a competitor or start a competing enterprise.”).
37. Id. (“The agreements also may protect other valuable information such as trade
secrets (beyond protections already offered by existing trade secret laws). Other forms of
noncompetes address issues of refraining from competition after the sale of a business or
non-solicitation agreements related to poaching clients or employees.”).
38. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
39. See Stone, supra note 28, at 746–56.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 748.
42. DiMatteo, supra note 14, at 765–66.
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legitimate business interest), but the scope is too broad and can be cut back through
the reasonableness analyses used by the courts.43 This situation of overreaching
beyond the permissible bounds of the legitimate interests prong of the
reasonableness test has negative implications for employee freedoms and for the
ethical bounds of the employer-employee relationship.44
What types of employer business interests qualify as legitimate protectable
interests under a particular state’s common law will vary. However, employers
often insert protections in the contract related to trade secrets (even if they are
arguably covered by state law already), various pieces of confidential information
on processes and products, and customer lists, as well as nonsolicitation clauses
intended to keep a departing employee from raiding the ranks of her coworkers or
the nonsolicitation of customers, or provisions to recoup the cost of investing in
employee human capital.45 The contracts also contain an element of scope, in terms
of the time and geographic limitations, which is subject to the scrutiny of the
traditional reasonableness inquiry by a reviewing court.46
An additional issue concerning knowledge control by a former employer is the
contractual restriction concerning confidentiality related to the employer’s business
(also known as a nondisclosure agreement, or NDA).47 In some situations courts
will not enforce nondisclosure agreements because they are so broad they violate
public policy in that they act as a boundless restriction on the individual
employee.48 There are also instances where courts will balance the conflicting
public policy goals of the sanctity of the duty of confidentiality of an employee to
her employer against concerns of fostering socially valuable activities, such as an
employee proving employment discrimination49 or protecting whistleblowers.50
Once a former employer detects that a departing employee is in violation of the
noncompete, the first step is likely a letter from the firm’s lawyers to the departing

43. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“While courts may ‘blue pencil’ [duration] provisions to make them shorter and hence
enforceable, this Court would decline to exercise its discretion to do so in this case because .
. . the employment agreement as a whole overreaches.” (internal citations omitted)).
44. See generally Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 20.
45. See, e.g., Bishara, supra note 7, at 315 fig.1A.
46. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 14, at 765.
47. For a detailed discussion of the interplay of nondisclosure agreements and
noncompetes, including judicial refusals to enforce NDAs or noncompetes on public policy
grounds, see Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM.
BUS. L.J. 151, 169–73 (1998).
48. For example, in a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision, Town of Cicero v.
Johnson, No. 06 L 13062 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 28, 2010), a former municipal employee’s
nondisclosure agreement was not enforced because it was overly broad and in contravention
of the public interest.
49. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 8 A.3d 209, 225–26 (N.J. 2010) (applying the
six-part balancing evaluation of the Sixth Circuit in Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529
F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008), to determine when an employee’s violation of their employer’s
confidentiality policy is permissible).
50. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47, at 174–79 (including the issue of motive in
the public policy interest analysis for whistleblower laws).
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employee demanding that the restrictive covenant be honored.51 In the case of an
employee going to work for a competitor, a demand letter giving notice of the
alleged breach and threatening litigation against the new employer for tortious
interference with contractual relations may also be sent to put that party on notice
of the alleged breach, as well as to perhaps send a message and create a chilling
effect. At this stage, the former employer may receive the requested action or some
assurance of compliance, perhaps out of fear of the downside risk involved with
litigation. In some cases, the former employer may see its demands satisfied when
the new employer simply terminates the employee. As with other threatened or
actual contract litigation, it is also possible that some combination of the three
possible parties to a noncompete enforcement lawsuit reach a negotiated settlement
to resolve the former employer’s concerns.52 The backstopping mechanism for
enforcing noncompetes is, of course, a full adjudication of the dispute by the
courts.
However, because of the fear that irreparable harm will result if some equitable
relief—in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and perhaps a later
permanent injunction—is not obtained, the former employer may opt to bring
immediate suit against the employee and the competitor. If the former employer
does not act quickly to win the TRO battle, the confidential information may be
leaked to the competitor, for instance, and the entire war may be lost; this would
make it vastly more difficult for the former employer to allege that it was actually
harmed by a breach compensable by money damages at trial. The dispute may be
decided at the TRO stage and, thus, may act as a catalyst to promote some
compromise by the parties once each side’s leverage becomes apparent.53
Otherwise, the matter may be delayed for some time, and depending on the status

51. See, e.g., Duy v. Lake Weed-A-Way, Inc., No. A04-1721, 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS
531, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2005) (explaining that after detecting the violation of a
post-sale noncompete, the aggrieved party first sent a cease-and-desist demand letter prior to
the lawsuit).
52. For a law and economics perspective of noncompetes, including the ex ante and ex
post views of negotiation and later resolving noncompete-based disputes among workers,
employers, and competitors, see Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not To
Compete from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin
Program in Law & Econ. 2d Series, Working Paper No. 137, 2001), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/137.EAP_.covenants.pdf.
53. In the case of a former corporate employer suing a former employee to enforce a
noncompete, it is easy to imagine how the employer would have superior resources and
litigation staying power to overpower the individual, regardless of the merits of the case.
Where a firm sues the employee and the new firm (competitor), there may be more equal
resources available and comparable leverage devoted to the dispute, but in that instance the
employee may end up caught in the middle as a pawn in a larger competitive strategy of rival
firms using noncompetes as “swords” as well as “shields.” For an interesting corollary from
an intellectual property-related and patent citation-based analysis of how a firm’s reputation
for aggressive enforcement of its patents can impact future efforts at intellectual property
protection, see Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Reputations for
Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers Via Inventor
Mobility, 30 STRAT. MGMT J. 1349 (2009).
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quo of where the worker is currently employed, the noncompete may be essentially
worthless, and damage to the former employer may have already accrued.
B. Noncompete Enforcement and the Relevant Stakeholders
To fully appreciate the noncompete formation and any subsequent enforcement
process in relation to the resource-based theory, it is useful to first have a sense of
the incentives, goals, and position of the parties that courts will consider when
asked to adjudicate noncompete disputes. That is to say, what are the interests of
the employer (the firm), the employee bound by the noncompete restrictions (the
individual), and the public (in terms of the public policy implications of
enforcement) that courts will consider when applying the reasonableness test
discussed previously? The perspectives of employers and employees on
noncompetes are for the most part two sides of the same coin and therefore will be
examined serially, with the public interest perspective to follow.
1. The Perspective of Employers and Employees
Employers will use noncompetes as an additional mechanism to assert control
over knowledge related to their business beyond the default rules provided by the
doctrines of duty of loyalty and trade secret law and in addition to other contractual
devices such as nondisclosure agreements. On one hand, a noncompete is useful for
employers to protect their investment in human capital.54 As Russell Coff has
pointed out, rent seeking by employees can neutralize a firm’s competitive
advantage and harm a firm’s performance, therefore making a noncompete an
advantageous way to address potential holdups by otherwise freely mobile
employees. 55
On the other hand, there are fears that employers can abuse the power of
noncompetes by using them in an inappropriate, overreaching way to stifle
competition by restricting knowledge spillovers and creating a disincentive for
employee mobility.56 In this sense, the reasonableness test of a noncompete’s
provisions provides a sort of de facto presumption that some restriction is
warranted, as long as it is within the case-by-case “reasonable” bounds. Overall,

54. For a discussion of the role of noncompetes in promoting investments in human
capital, see Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not To Compete,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981). See also Bishara, supra note 7 (arguing that noncompetes can
be selectively enforced, depending on the industry involved and the knowledge spillover
sought, to maximize human capital investments from employers).
55. See generally Russell W. Coff, When Competitive Advantage Doesn’t Lead to
Performance: The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power, 10 ORG. SCI.
119 (1999).
56. See Kate O’Neill, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go?’—Covenants Not To Compete in a
Down Economy: A Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 83, 84 (2010) (proposing that appellate courts “minimize[e] the enforcement of
covenants not to compete where the assenting employee lacks significant bargaining power
while preserving employers’ abilities to enforce these covenants against employees who
enjoy such power”).
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noncompetes can, thus, be critiqued as giving significant bargaining power to
employers and opening the door for a moral hazard of using the noncompete as a
way to scare employees from going to a competitor, even when a properly
challenged noncompete clause would be deemed unenforceable. The
unpredictability of enforcement and the vagueness of the reasonableness test have
also been cited by commentators as key reasons to reform57 or eliminate
noncompetes.58
Contrary to the competitive advantage perspective that promotes the employer’s
interests and recognizes business incentives, there is also a public policy approach
in favor of empowering and protecting the individual employee—essentially a
version of an employee-focused workers’ rights view.59 This view would place the
ownership of the fruits of a worker’s intellectual labors and human capital with the
worker and is thus in opposition to the notion of a noncompete agreement.60 At the
root of the problem of an employee being, on balance, harmed by restrictive
covenants aimed at allocating knowledge rights is a concern that the individual may
not appreciate the restrictions at the time of contracting because she sees the clause
as a means to an end (i.e., employment) and because she is in an inferior bargaining
position.61 When the economic climate is poor, an employee may be even more
disadvantaged from a bargaining position, and she is more likely to overvalue an
employment opportunity and underestimate the longer-term restrictions of a
noncompete.62
An even sharper critique of noncompetes is that they are overtly negative from
an economic perspective. A leading advocate for the wholesale banning of
noncompetes is Professor Alan Hyde. In a recent article, he reviews the growing
empirical economic and management research where noncompetes are a factor in
studies of employee mobility and entrepreneurial activity.63 Hyde focuses on these
studies’ conclusions about the potential negative aspects of noncompetes such as
economic harm and infringement on individual freedom, thus concluding that they
are an unacceptably anticompetitive anachronism.64 Accordingly, Professor Hyde
maintains that the negative aspects of noncompetes outweigh the positive aspects
and advocates for scrapping these contracts.65

57. See, e.g., Emily J. Kuo, Comment, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not To
Compete in Telecommuting Employment Relationships, 1996 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 565
(arguing from a perspective of the changing telecommuting workplace for greater
intervention by legislatures instead of courts, because noncompetes are a policy question).
58. See generally Hyde, supra note 12.
59. See Bishara, supra note 7, at 311–13 (discussing the employee rights approach to
noncompete enforcement).
60. See generally Stone, supra note 38 (discussing the human capital ownership tension
between employees and employers and ultimately taking the perspective that noncompetes
are disadvantageous to the individual worker’s rights).
61. See Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 20, at 36–37.
62. See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 56.
63. Hyde, supra note 12, at 9–10.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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2. The Public Interest
The third stakeholder group considered by courts when applying the
reasonableness test to a noncompete is the “public.” As discussed earlier, the notion
is that the restriction in the covenant must, as some courts put it, “not be contrary to
public policy”66 or “not [be] harmful to the general public.”67 While this element
essentially acts as a final, high-level inquiry as to the propriety of the terms of the
agreement from a public policy standpoint, it appears to be rarely invoked
successfully to void a noncompete clause.
When evaluating a request for an equitable remedy to restrict a person’s postemployment mobility, a court will balance the competing interests of the parties
and the implications for the public, even in the absence of a noncompete clause.
For instance, in Bimbo Bakeries v. Botticella, a trade secrets misappropriation case,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed the district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction to prevent a former senior executive, Botticella, who had
knowledge of the secret process for creating the texture of the famous Thomas’
English Muffins “nooks and crannies,” from working for a competitor.68 The
employee had signed a “Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention
Assignment Agreement,”69 but not a noncompete agreement, presumably because
he was originally working in California where such a restriction is clearly against
public policy.70
The Bimbo court found that “[t]here are several public interests at play,”
including “a generalized public interest in ‘upholding the inviolability of trade
secrets and enforceability of confidentiality agreements.’”71 The court stated that
“there is a public interest in employers being free to hire whom they please and in
employees being free to work for whom they please. Of these latter two interests,
Pennsylvania courts consider the right of the employee to be the more
significant.”72 The court continued to note that it was “satisfied on the facts of this
case that the public interest in preventing the misappropriation of Bimbo’s trade
secrets outweighs the temporary restriction on Botticella's choice of
employment.”73

66. Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 767 N.W.2d 898, 905 (Wis. 2009).
67. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (quoting Reed,
Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976)).
68. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2010).
69. Id. at 105.
70. For a discussion of California’s public policy against restrictions on employee
mobility, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2010).
71. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 613 F.3d at 119 (quoting Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v.
Botticella, No. 10-0194, 2010 WL 571774, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010)).
72. Id. (citing additional cases, Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. Blose-Venable, 652 A.2d
1345, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[T]he right of a business person to be protected against
unfair competition stemming from the usurpation of his or her trade secrets must be balanced
against the right of an individual to the unhampered pursuit of the occupations and
livelihoods for which he or she is best suited.” (internal citation omitted)) and Wexler v.
Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434–35 (Pa. 1960) (construing Bimbo opinion as “noting a
societal interest in employee mobility”)).
73. Id.
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The “against public policy” assertion challenging a noncompete comes up in
two situations in the modern courts. The first is in situations where choice of law
provisions are implicated or where a constrained employee crosses jurisdictional
lines compelling courts to decide if the noncompete policy of one state allows the
enforcement of the contract that may have been permissible in the first
jurisdiction.74 The second scenario—that a noncompete is against public policy and
thus impermissible—is more aligned with the blanket statement from courts in
enforcing states that the agreements are scrutinized because of their anticompetitive
character and harm to the free exercise of a person’s chosen profession.75 In
addition, this common concern is related to the public policy interest of the free
pursuit of an employee’s livelihood (her ability to earn a living) and the impact the
restriction will have on competition.76 Courts can disfavor noncompetes on other
public policy grounds as well, including the effect they have on denying the public
valuable services and also the negative effect they have on the individual wishing
to pursue his or her trade or profession.77 These public policy-based concerns over
preserving free employee mobility and employer protections are exacerbated by
cross-jurisdictional issues because noncompete enforcement levels vary widely.78
While the general public’s interest in accessing those public goods is not usually
addressed by the courts there are, however, examples that the success of these

74. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Products, Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1030–32 (4th
Cir. 1983) (overturning a lower court’s holding that an Ohio noncompete could be
enforceable in Alabama where such restrictions were invalid as against public policy).
75. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47, at 156. Interestingly, despite the aversion
to anticompetitive impacts of noncompetes, the one potential stakeholder group not
considered by courts is that of the competitor to the noncompete-enforcing firm. While not
explicitly considered in the public interest evaluation, the competitor’s interest may be
implicitly covered by the court’s desire to promote general competition. Nonetheless, there
do not appear to be cases where courts have explicitly considered the knowledge transfer
implications and the role of that transfer in increasing competition and innovation.
76. See, e.g., Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Altair Invs. NA, LLC, 869 N.Y.S.2d 465, 471
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008). The court in Ashland stated that:
A restrictive covenant is unenforceable if its duration is unreasonable because
of the “‘powerful considerations of public policy which militate against
sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood,’” as well as the general public policy
favoring robust and uninhibited competition. Protecting trade secrets and truly
confidential information, however, does not have to be time limited in every
instance where the covenant does not otherwise prevent a former employee
from pursuing his or her livelihood or interfere with competition.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., Friddle v. Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Ala. 1991) (stating that in
Alabama noncompetes are disfavored “‘because they tend not only to deprive the public of
efficient service but also tend to impoverish the individual’” (citations omitted)).
78. For discussions of the cross-state conflict of laws and choice of law and forum in
noncompetes and the related implications, see Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and
the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381 (2008); see also Gillian Lester &
Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An American
Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389 (2010) (discussing choice of law and forum
for noncompetition agreement enforcement in the United States).
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public interest arguments related to physician noncompetes may be on the rise in
some jurisdictions.79 Accordingly, a third possible scenario of a court’s application
of the “injurious to the public” standard is related to the concern that enforcing a
noncompete agreement will deprive the public of the fruits of competition.80
Specifically, the notion is often that honoring a restrictive covenant in certain
situations will result in harm to the public’s access to a vital service or be otherwise
against public policy.81 The most common example is related to physicians and the
provision of health care services.82 For instance, concern for patient choice and
physician expertise could implicate access to specialized medical services in rural
communities.83
Interestingly, noncompetes for lawyers are unenforceable on public policy
grounds based on a theory of access to legal services, but, despite support from the
American Medical Association for a similar ban on noncompetes for physicians,
few courts have agreed that doctors should be treated like lawyers when it comes to
noncompetes.84 Notably, one industry that has overtly organized around
noncompete policy and successfully shaped a few state enforcement policies
through its lobbying efforts is the broadcasting industry, which has worked to
prohibit noncompetes.85 Some states have added other professionals beyond
lawyers and doctors to the list of those exempt from noncompete enforcement; for
instance in Alabama, veterinarians are also prohibited from having noncompetes.86
Also, as a matter of public policy, noncompete doctrine will play an increasingly
important role as a mechanism that balances employers’ investments in human
capital and innovation with the broader societal goals of encouraging knowledge
diffusion and dynamic competition. It is this third, yet neglected, facet of the public
policy inquiry that is ripe for being reenergized by applying the resource-based
theory to assess noncompete legitimacy. Accordingly, the resource-based theory
discussed in Part III will help address the lack of efficacy associated with the public
interest concern.

79. See Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad
Medicine? Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal
Profession, 98 KY. L.J. 131, 146–49 (2009).
80. See generally id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 150. But see Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d. 751 (N.Y. 1971) (despite
discussion of the defendant’s former employee’s restriction of practicing oral surgery in a
rural county setting, the court only focused on the propriety of the restriction and did not
discuss the public policy implications of restricting the public’s access to specialized health
care).
84. Klimkina, supra note 79, at 140–49.
85. For a discussion of the broadcasting industry noncompete statutes and implications,
see Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement
Law & the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447 (2009). Several states have such
legislation, including New York’s “Broadcast Employees’ Freedom To Work Act.” N.Y.
LAB. L. § 202-k (McKinney 2009).
86. See, e.g., Martin v. Battistella, 9 So. 3d 1235 (Ala. 2008).
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II. NONCOMPETES, STATE POLICIES, AND VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THEIR
ENFORCEMENT
In this Part, we begin by discussing the nature and status of noncompete
enforcement in the United States, including an overview of the reasonableness test
applied by the courts when reviewing these restrictive covenants. Next, we address
some of the modern noncompete enforcement trends by various jurisdictions. We
conclude this Part by presenting a critique of the current noncompete enforcement
regime in light of the evolving and growing nature of information in the knowledge
economy.
A. The Use and Enforcement of Noncompetes
Covenants not to compete have a long history in English and American common
law87 and, in general, most states will allow some enforcement of noncompete
agreements.88 Restrictive covenants such as these have long been reviewed with
suspicion by the courts because of their tendency to reduce competition and restrain
the freedom of individuals to practice their chosen profession.89 Despite this
long-standing suspicion there is still no consensus from judges and policymakers
on the proper extent of noncompete enforcement; therefore, there remains
considerable variation90 in how state courts and legislatures view these contracts.91
Initially, however, we briefly review the theoretical underpinnings of noncompetes.
In their study of the dispersion of knowledge and its relation to the mobility of
engineers in certain geographic regions, Professors Almeida and Kogut observed
the following about the unique properties of knowledge as a resource:
Ideas, because they have no material content, should be the least
spatially-bounded of all economic activities. Being weightless, their
transport is limited only by the quality and availability of
communication. Since ideas serve both as the inputs and outputs in
their own production, their location need be constrained neither by the
happenstance of the spatial distribution of raw materials, energy, and
labor, nor by that of demand and markets.92

87. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
629–46 (1960) (the authoritative review of the extensive history of restrictive employment
covenants and their origin in the sale of businesses and trade associations).
88. See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, supra note 30; see also Michael J.
Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent
Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 122–35 (2008)
(describing the modern approach to noncompete enforcement).
89. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47, at 156.
90. See Reichert, supra note 25, at 132–33 (“[n]oncompetition law can vary
dramatically among jurisdictions,” but a reasonableness test is generally applied).
91. See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways To Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement
of Covenants Not To Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 756–57 (2011).
92. Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of
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In part, because noncompetes are blunt instruments for first assessing and then
protecting knowledge ownership, they have remained controversial. They are blunt
in the sense that these contracts seek to restrict the transfer of information that is,
arguably, rightfully rivalrous (i.e., capable of being used by one employer at a
time)93 and excludible by the employer.94 While the noncompete allows the
employer to protect a legitimate interest in the knowledge, the mechanism of
restricting an employee’s freedom of movement does not only restrict the
protectable knowledge. To the contrary, the restriction on the employee’s mobility
may also serve to restrict the legitimate rights of the former employee to take
nonconfidential information and skills with them into a new occupation of their
choosing. To put it another way, using a noncompete to protect proprietary
knowledge may be like using a chainsaw when a scalpel would be appropriate, if
such a refined contractual tool existed for these purposes. This potentially unfair
and overreaching aspect of noncompetes is among the most controversial.95 This is,
thus, consistent with the long-running skepticism of noncompetes from the courts
because they are, on their face, restricting trade and freedom of employment.96
The free flow of information, particularly in the high-tech sector, has been a
focal point for arguments concerning the economic influence, if any, of
noncompete enforcement.97 Most famously, California’s well-known ban on
restrictive covenants related to post-employment activities of employees98 and the
resultant high levels of employee mobility has been cited as one reason why Silicon
Valley has prospered.99
It is also important to note that noncompetes, where enforced, are only part of an
employer’s toolkit to protect information. Other tools include the default rules of
trade secret protection,100 opportunities to gain intellectual property protection in
some instances (such as patent protection),101 and confidentiality or nondisclosure
agreements.102 In particular, confidentiality agreements are “restrictions on access
Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 MGMT. SCI. 905, 905 (1999).
93. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Response, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822 (2010) (“‘Rivalrousness’ is a property of the consumption of a
good. Consumption of a good is rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the
opportunity of other individuals, Y, Z, etc., to consume the good.”).
94. See Hyde, supra note 12, at 8–9 (tying noncompetes to what he sees as improper
attempts to restrict firm-generated information).
95. See id.
96. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47, at 156 (“Anti-competition covenants are legally
disfavored because they restrain trade by inhibiting promisors’ freedom of movement among
employment opportunities.”).
97. See generally Hyde, supra note 12.
98. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2010) (In full, the statute simply states:
“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”).
99. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575 (1999).
100. See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2007).
101. Id.
102. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47.
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to information, rather than employee movement” and are more easily enforced
under a theory of freedom of contract.103 Contract-based protection—by a
confidentiality agreement and a noncompete—can be useful and even a
comfortable option for employers.104
Both employers and those selling the goodwill of a business will understandably
attempt to use noncompetes to restrict knowledge transfer to a competitor.
Traditionally, a basic noncompete clause includes a limitation as to the geographic
area and length of time a former employee is restricted from starting a competing
enterprise or going to work for a competitor as a means of protecting the initial
employer’s legitimate interests.105 The clause may also list specific competitors for
whom the employee is prohibited from working during the restriction period or
restrictions as to soliciting clients of the former employer.106
Another common restriction embedded in a covenant not to compete disallows
the former employee from soliciting other workers to leave the employer to join the
competing enterprise, which could serve to drain further human capital resources
and knowledge from the business.107 A noncompete may also be used in

103. Id. at 157.
104. See Kristen Osenga, Information May Want To Be Free, but Information Products
Do Not: Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2099, 2117 (2009) (discussing the options for protecting the rights in information
products and stating that “[c]ontract law certainly provides an appealing alternative to
traditional intellectual property protection. Like intellectual property regimes, contracts carry
the force of law. Businesses are comfortable and familiar with contracts, probably even more
so than intellectual property.”).
105. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt, supra note 88, at 116. For example, Garrison and
Wendt state that:
Traditionally, the courts recognized two primary interests as legitimate
justifications for a noncompete agreement: the employer’s interests in
protecting the goodwill of the business and in protecting its trade secrets. An
employee noncompete agreement is often designed to prevent an employee
from taking advantage of the employer’s goodwill, which the employee
generated in his or her dealings with customers. Employees often develop
personal relationships with their customers and clients, but the goodwill so
generated is a valuable asset of the business because the employees are acting
as agents at the time. Under the so-called “customer contact” theory, the
relational interests of the former employer are protected.
Id. (citations omitted).
106. See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 230 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (the
noncompete clause listed nine competitors “and any and all of their subsidiaries, affiliates, or
successors” to which the employee could not seek employment as well as a twelve-month
agreement to not “contact or solicit any past or present [Victaulic] customers on behalf of
any business in competition with [it]”).
107. See, e.g., Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. KW Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D.
Fla. 2009). In Continental Group the district court found the plaintiff former employer had:
shown a legitimate business purpose for this prohibition under Fla. Stat.
§ 542.335 due to the loss of goodwill of clients by having TCG on-site property
managers switch to KW. Property managers are the on-site representatives at
these condominium buildings who develop positive relationships with the
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conjunction with other theories of knowledge ownership, such as alongside related
trade secret and patent protection litigation against a former employee-owner.108 In
the case of a state that has a statutory public policy in favor of noncompete
enforcement, such as Florida, an employer can seek to protect all of these business
interests, including an investment in training provided to the employee.109
B. Covenant Not To Compete Enforcement in the United States: The Current State
of Affairs
Again, while the majority of states will enforce noncompetes to some extent,110
there are a few high-profile instances where, on the margins, states essentially ban
the use of employee noncompetes.111 In those states the courts consistently uphold
the ban based on public policy grounds.112 However, those that do allow some sort
of postemployment noncompete enforcement will apply a reasonableness test
coupled with an evaluation of the stakeholders’ interests.113 Thus, consensus among
states enforcing noncompetes centers on the reasonableness test to balance the
rights of the parties to the contract (i.e., employees and employers), as well as
considering the policy impact and the public interest.114 Moreover, courts have
governing boards of the condominium, a critical consideration when these
governing boards vote to extend or terminate a management contract.
Id. at 1375.
108. See, e.g., Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int’l, Inc., No. 99-5003, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 11786 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000) (a Tennessee liquid smoke manufacturer
sued a former employee-owner and family member to enjoin defendant from starting a
competing enterprise based on theories including a noncompete enforcement, theft of a trade
secret, and patent protection).
109. For a description of the breadth of the Florida policy, see AutoNation, Inc. v.
O’Brien, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2004), where the court stated:
Pursuant to Florida’s statute, “legitimate business interests” include: trade
secrets, valuable confidential business information, substantial relationships
with specific prospective or existing customers, customer goodwill, and
extraordinary or specialized training. Fla. Stat. 542.335(1)(b). Moreover, courts
are statutorily required to construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing
reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the
person seeking enforcement.
110. See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, supra note 30.
111. The two states with near complete bans on covenants not to compete are North
Dakota and, famously, California, although even in those states restrictions on
postemployment competition related to an owner’s sale of a business are permissible. See
Bishara, supra note 7, at 292 n.19.
112. The most recent California Supreme Court case addressing the public policy
implications of the state’s statutory ban on noncompetes is Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008), which reiterates California’s strong public policy against
enforcing contractual restraints on employment and rejecting calls for a “narrow restraint”
exception. Id. at 292–93.
113. See Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 8, at 321–22; see also Reichert, supra note 25.
114. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Johnson Controls, the court commented that:
In fashioning the [reasonableness] analysis, New York courts have endeavored
to balance public policy concerns relating to the benefits of competition and the
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traditionally balanced the rights of employers and employees when weighing the
importance of equitable relief in noncompete disputes. 115
The legal reasoning restated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Boulanger
v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc.116 is a representative example of how enforcing states begin
to review the terms of a challenged employment-related noncompete. There the
court stated, “A covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is necessary to
protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and
consonant with the public interest. Covenants not to compete are valid if they are
reasonable in light of the facts in each case.”117 In some states this element is
sometimes phrased as “not injurious to the public.”118 Essentially, this element
means that “[t]he common law reasonableness approach is an attempt to balance
the conflicting interests of employers and employees as well as the societal
interests in open and fair competition.”119 In addition, “[s]ociety has interests in
maintaining free and fair competition and in fostering a marketplace environment
that encourages new ventures and innovation[, and t]here is a complementary
public interest in preventing employers from using their superior bargaining
position to unduly restrict labor markets.”120
There is also a trend among many states to codify their noncompete policy.121
This process often requires the legislature to clarify the reasonableness test the
courts should apply.122 Other states are currently contemplating noncompete
unfettered flow of talent and ideas in our economy with employers’ legitimate
right to protect the fruits of their labor, the idea being that the proper balancing
of these factors will produce the most wealth and innovation . . . for society. It
is important to keep in mind, however, that on a less grand scale the interests to
be balanced are those of the individual employer and employee.
Id. at 533–34 (citation omitted).
115. See T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 55 (2005) (advocating that a court’s enforcement analysis “be
industry-specific in order to best assess the benefits of knowledge spillover, incentives for
innovation, and whether economic efficiencies may be outweighed by other interests”
(footnotes omitted)).
116. 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004).
117. Id. at 576–77 (citations omitted).
118. See, e.g., Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Altair Invs. NA, LLC, 869 N.Y.S.2d 465, 472
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
119. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 88, at 114–15.
120. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
121. As of 2009, eighteen states have enacted some form of legislation addressing the
enforceability of covenants not to compete. Bishara, supra note 91, at 759, 778. These states
are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
and Wisconsin. Id. Other states, such as Tennessee and West Virginia, have basic antitrust
statutes that are invoked when noncompetes are evaluated. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25101, -18-104 (2001) (disfavoring any contract attempting to lessen competition); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-3(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (the state’s antitrust statute).
122. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(7)(a)(A)–(B) (2009).
(A) Competition by the employee with the employer is limited or restrained
after termination of employment, but the restraint is limited to a period of time,
a geographic area and specified activities, all of which are reasonable in
relation to the services described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph;
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statutes of some kind, most notably the Commonwealth of Massachusetts123 and the
State of Illinois.124
The generalized and undefined notion of reasonableness, not surprisingly, does
not give much guidance to the courts and, as a result of the disparate facts of
individual cases, some courts have refined the reasonableness standard into a
formal test.125 Essentially this allows for a more nuanced framework to balance the
rights and interests of the stakeholders (i.e., the employee, the employer, and the
public). For instance, the New York Court of Appeals presents the test this way:
The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for
employee agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test. A
restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the
protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not
impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the
public. A violation of any prong renders the covenant invalid.126

(B) The services performed by the employee pursuant to the agreement include
substantial involvement in management of the employer’s business, personal
contact with customers, knowledge of customer requirements related to the
employer’s business or knowledge of trade secrets or other proprietary
information of the employer . . . .
Id.
BROWNSBERGER,
123. See
Reform
Noncompete
Contracts,
WILL
http://willbrownsberger.com/index.php/end-noncompete-contracts (Massachusetts State
Representative Brownsberger’s website detailing plans to resubmit his co-sponsored
noncompete reform legislation to the Massachusetts legislature).
124. See HB 0016 Introduced To Create an “Illinois Covenants Not To Compete Act”,
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/
Updated_HB0016_Briefing.pdf. Like the Massachusetts proposed legislation, the Illinois
version of noncompete reform seeks to formalize the bounds of the traditional
reasonableness test by requiring the contract to be “narrowly tailored to support the
protection of a legitimate business interest” and to apply it to specific levels of employees.
Id. The proposal also provides for rebuttable presumptions:
a restrictive covenant is not narrowly tailored to promote a legitimate business
interest if (i) the covenant’s duration exceeds one year; (ii) the covenant’s
geographic area extends beyond any region in which the key employee
provides employment services during the one year preceding termination of the
employment relationship; or (iii) the type of services covered by the covenant
extends beyond the nature of the work performed by the key employee.
Id.
125. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999).
126. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court went on to write that
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in
determining the validity of employee agreements not to compete. “In this
context a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the
extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s
legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably
burdensome to the employee.”
Id. (quoting Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976)).
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When the courts apply the reasonableness test, they are mindful of the
anticompetitive nature of a noncompete and, accordingly, evaluate what legitimate
interest, if any, an employer is attempting to protect by enforcing the contract.127
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals also pointed out that, “[i]n general, we have
strictly applied the rule to limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition”
and, in specific cases, “limited the cognizable employer interests under the first
prong of the common-law rule to the protection against misappropriation of the
employer’s trade secrets or of confidential customer lists, or protection from
competition by a former employee whose services are unique or extraordinary.”128
As is the case in New York, some states129 will evaluate whether an employee
possesses such an extraordinary skill and expertise that a strict imposition of
post-employment restrictions is necessary to protect the employer from unfair
competition.130 Even where a court goes beyond the reasonableness test and looks
for unfair competition, the problems with predictability and equal application of
this standard remain. A resource-based view of the firm analysis of
knowledge-ownership rights will begin to address these problems.
C. Problems and Criticisms of the Current Approach to Noncompete Enforcement
Although most courts across the United States will employ a reasonableness test
to evaluate the propriety of a request to enforce a noncompete agreement, outcomes
will vary because of the unique nature of each case and the inconsistencies inherent
in the common-law process.131 The variance of noncompete enforcement across
jurisdictions—and even within states—has drawbacks for business and innovation
because of the undefined and unpredictable nature of the reasonableness test.132

127. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47, at 169–70.
128. BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223 (citing Reed, Roberts Assocs., 353 N.E.2d at
593–94).
129. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt, supra note 88, at 128 (“The idea underlying the
extraordinary training interest is that if an employer has expended substantial resources to
provide an employee with some unique skills, then it would be unfair for that employee to
use those skills to compete with his former employer.”); see also Hapney v. Cent. Garage,
Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“The rationale is that if an employer
dedicates time and money to the extraordinary training and education of an employee,
whereby the employee attains a unique skill or an enhanced degree of sophistication in an
existing skill, then it is unfair to permit that employee to use those skills to the benefit of a
competitor when the employee has contracted not to do so.”).
130. See, e.g., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that oral
surgeon skills in a rural upstate New York community were not sufficiently unique and
valuable to justify a refusal to enforce the contractual protection of employer); BDO
Seidman, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (accountant’s services and skills not sufficiently extraordinary).
131. See William B. Chandler, III, Delaware Chancellor, The Institutional Investor’s
Goals for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (2000).
Chandler, a Delaware Chancellor, states, “[A]s others have described, the United States has a
common law system that develops legal principles in an evolutionary way—interstitially,
slowly, gradually, leaving great areas of uncertainty, unpredictability.” Id. at 65.
132. See, e.g., Reichert, supra note 25, at 131–37 (discussing the unpredictability of
enforcing noncompetes following a merger or acquisition in the context of the changing
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Accordingly, we assert that this variance across jurisdictions and unpredictability of
what states or a given court will consider a legitimate interest results from a
doctrine based on a vague reasonableness standard that is incoherent in application.
In other words, the means for enforcing a noncompete (the reasonableness analysis)
is sometimes an uncertain standard for reaching the end goal (enforcing reasonably
limited restrictions to promote a legitimate business interest), which also often has
underlying policy differences in each state.
Beyond the obvious problem that a reasonableness analysis applied by trial
courts will create uncertainty, an initial criticism of the general approach is that it
lacks grounding in solid principle. In other words, the reasonableness approach can
be vague and uncertain because it tries to be accommodating in balancing
conflicting stakeholder interests without a guiding principle that defines the
preferred outcomes. As it stands, noncompete enforcement policy is merely based
on balancing the interests of parties to the contract without a broader articulation of
why that balancing matters.
An example of the inherent failing of the reasonableness approach is that the
overlay concern of anticompetitive contracts and the related inquiry into whether
the employer is seeking the court’s help to retain a protectable business interest will
sometimes produce inconsistent outcomes. Courts in different jurisdictions disagree
about what constitutes a protectable interest, with states falling along a spectrum of
weak to strong enforcement.133 Weak enforcement states, for instance, will protect
only confidential information and customer lists that the employer expended effort
to develop, while strong enforcement states will protect those employer
investments as well as the firm’s goodwill, the non-solicitation of other employees,
and employer-provided training.134
However, in both the case of weak and strong enforcement, there is no clear
unifying theoretical thread used by the courts to determine exactly why those
aspects are indeed protectable interests. There are indications that more states are
moving slightly toward greater enforcement over time.135 This trend suggests that
employers are, perhaps based on a superior bargaining position and litigation
resources, in the aggregate working toward greater recognition of noncompetes on
a case-by-case basis. The trend toward greater enforcement is evidence of employer
preferences, even if there is a lack of obvious direct evidence that there is not
widespread lobbying for these changes. Another concern is that employers may
tend to exploit their superior bargaining position at the start of employment to
negotiate onerous noncompete terms.136 Part of the problem is that a piecemeal,
case-by-case evaluation of these agreements is not grounded in the business

technologically-driven economy).
133. See generally Bishara, supra note 91.
134. Bishara, supra note 7, at 315.
135. See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 88. The drift toward greater
enforcement and formalization of noncompete policy among enforcing states is also
addressed in Bishara, supra note 91.
136. For a discussion of how rent-seeking behavior by employees or overreaching by
employers may have reduced the expected competitive advantage gains and payout to
shareholders, see Coff, supra note 55.
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principles of competitive advantage,137 even though the business goal is implicit in
the reasonableness test.
Another explanation for why the current reasonableness evaluation applied by
most courts is an inadequate and outdated method for evaluating noncompetes is
that modern business and employment realities are not fully addressed by the
reasonableness approach. This is related to two developing trends in business and
employment: the nature and value of knowledge and the increased mobility of
skilled labor.
In terms of the importance of knowledge, it has been recognized in the last few
decades that the U.S. economy is moving from a goods-producing to a
service-based economy.138 There has been, essentially, a shift in business focus to
information and knowledge creation and protection as a source of competitive
advantage in a knowledge-based economy. This is evidenced by the
acknowledgment in the management literature that human resources are an
important source of competitive advantage for firms, as is the development and
retention of tacit knowledge within teams of employees.139 Moreover, the
management literature has also squarely put a knowledge-based analysis at the
forefront of theoretical discussions of the nature of the firm.140
Legal scholars have also begun to formally address the role of law in achieving
competitive advantage over business rivals in both the management141 and legal
literature.142 Specifically, the strategic use of the law has been called “the last great
untapped source of competitive advantage.”143 This trend continues with a recent

137. For a discussion of a definition of competitive advantage and a related discussion of
the use of law for competitive advantage, see George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using
Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641 (2010).
As the words imply, competitive advantage is something that gives a firm an
advantage over competitors. In his classic work Competitive Advantage,
Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter explains that competitive
advantage arises when firms offer their customers value that exceeds value
offered by their competitors and operate in a profitable manner by charging
customers more than the cost of value creation.
Id. at 642–43 (emphasis in original).
138. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 28, at 721–30 (discussing the rising importance of
knowledge and the “changing nature of the employment relationship” in the last decades).
NONAKA
&
HIROTAKA
TAKEUCHI,
THE
139. See
generally
IKUJIRO
KNOWLEDGE-CREATING COMPANY (1995). See also Orozco, supra note 21.
140. The groundbreaking article on this topic is Robert M. Grant, Toward a
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 109 (1996).
141. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 378 (2008); see also CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY:
HOW TO USE THE LAW TO CREATE VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK (2005);
GEORGE SIEDEL & HELENA HAAPIO, PROACTIVE LAW FOR MANAGERS: A HIDDEN SOURCE OF
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2011).
142. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1
(2008).
143. Robert C. Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 575
(2010).
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recognition by legal and business academics that legal knowledge is a useful source
of business advantage for managers and teams within organizations.144
Similarly, the economic value of the individual worker’s human capital,
particularly in sectors such as high-tech where these workers develop and utilize
knowledge in the production process, is an obvious source of competitive
advantage for firms.145 Therefore, legal mechanisms such as covenants not to
compete, which aid employers in retaining control over knowledge assets, are
increasingly important to modern business activity.146 Moreover, the fact that
employee-based knowledge can “walk out the door” and move to a competitor is
particularly a concern for businesses.147 Subsequently, employee noncompete
agreements have become highly attractive, low-cost ways for employers to restrict
harmful knowledge spillovers that benefit rivals.
Given the increased importance of knowledge assets for competitive advantage,
the increased mobility of workers also makes noncompetes attractive to employers
as they attempt to stem the outflow of talent and knowledge. Coupled with the fact
that knowledge is often expensive to produce initially, but easy to reproduce
subsequently by competitors, firms may see their investments in human capital
easily diffuse to competitors and other parties.148
This is also apparent in employers’ interest in promoting knowledge creation
and retention within a paradigm where more workers are employed on a
shorter-term or contingent basis.149 This so-called high-velocity labor market150 of
the last decades means that American workers are not only more willing to change
locations for a career opportunity but that they are forced to do so within a new
employment context where shorter-term work arrangements are now the norm.151
Coupled with the greater mobility of firms across U.S. jurisdictions and around the
globe, these trends in employee mobility and concerns of competition are even
more pronounced because physical, geographical distance is often irrelevant to

144. See, e.g., Orozco, supra note 21.
145. For a discussion of the importance of various forms of human capital investment by
firms related to service and creative workers in a knowledge economy and the implications
of noncompete enforcement, see Bishara, supra note 7.
146. Evidence of this trend is found in Stone, supra note 28, at 738–39, which shows an
increase in the reported trade secret and noncompete litigation at the state and federal level
over various periods from 1970–1999.
147. For a discussion of the propensity of knowledge to be widely disbursed, see
generally Osenga, supra note 104.
148. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999).
149. See generally Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W.L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent
Work, Knowledge Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 680
(1998).
150. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).
151. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 2 (“This change from being a country that
was dominated by internal labor markets with corporate administrative rules and
expectations of long-term employment to one which is governed by an international spot
market for labor raises a host of issues for our national labor policies and labor and
employment law.”).
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defining a business competitor.152 Moreover, advantageous spillovers from
employee mobility can have some benefits for employees or employers, and
perhaps even promote economic activity and innovation. For instance, the
much-discussed success of the high-tech agglomeration economy of Silicon Valley
has been linked to the fact that California law essentially bans postemployment
restrictive covenants,153 in addition to a range of other factors.154
Another relatively new wrinkle to the enforcement of noncompetes, particularly
the proper scope and temporal length of a restriction, has become apparent in
instances in the context of the “internet age” and the so-called “cyberspace
workplace.”155 In the context of a high-tech economy, knowledge may have a more
limited time value than in the past. The well-known noncompete case of EarthWeb,
Inc. v. Schlack illustrates this point.156 In EarthWeb a former vice president at an
internet company catering to internet professionals had signed a twelve-month
noncompete and later left to work for another internet company, resulting in a
request for an injunction to stop him from continuing to work at the new company.
In that case the court found that the noncompete’s restriction as to time was
unreasonably restrictive and overreaching to protect the employer’s interests.157
Accordingly, the court found that the one-year provision was too long under the
circumstances where information in that industry became quickly outdated and
useless for competitive purposes.158 In doing so the court recognized that
knowledge, while a crucial asset worthy of contractual protection, can sometimes
lose its competitive value and profitability by the mere passage of time. Therefore,
like geographic scope, modern courts have had to reevaluate the notion of
reasonableness when it comes to reviewing time restrictions.159

152. See Stone, supra note 28, at 741–42 (“Some courts have restricted the time of an
allowable covenant on the grounds that in today’s fast-moving and competitive environment,
an employee’s knowledge loses its value quickly.”).
153. See Gilson, supra note 99 (arguing that California’s noncompete policy is a
substantial factor in the high mobility of workers and knowledge transfer that is integral to
the growth and success of Silicon Valley). Empirical evidence for Professor Gilson’s
assertion has been found in recent years. See, e.g., Fallick, et al., supra note 15; Marx et al.,
supra note 16.
154. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996) (finding that a combination of factors such as
networking, culture, investment patterns, and proximity to certain universities helped Silicon
Valley advance over Route 128 outside of Boston, Massachusetts despite early similarities to
the high-tech industries of both regions).
155. For a discussion of the complications of utilizing noncompete agreements in a
technology-based workplace, including the new tensions with time and geographic
restrictions in this context, see Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 8, at 321–24.
156. 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
157. Id. at 313 (“As a threshold matter, this Court finds that the one-year duration of
EarthWeb’s restrictive covenant is too long given the dynamic nature of this industry, its
lack of geographical borders, and Schlack’s former cutting-edge position with EarthWeb
where his success depended on keeping abreast of daily changes in content on the Internet.”).
158. Id.
159. See Stone, supra note 28, at 741.
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In their attempts to minimize these risks, firms use various methods to rein in
the possibility of unwanted human-capital diffusion. The managerial literature
discusses some ways firms can use organizational design and incentives to retain
knowledge within the firms’ administrative control.160 Firms, for example, use
coping strategies to contain human capital that include retention incentives,161
symbolic gestures,162 control rights,163 and shared governance.164 Property rights
and intellectual property laws may also offer a degree of appropriability to secure
knowledge in the form of patents, trade secrets, and copyrights.165
The resulting scenario is that noncompete litigation outcomes across
jurisdictions and industry contexts are largely unpredictable and appear to be
guided by the court’s intuitive and subjective preferences. These preferences give
an overall impression of ad hoc decision making. Compounding the problem is the
fact that the courts cannot obtain useful guidance from the legislature since the
language of noncompete statutes is often vague, perhaps because of the wide range
of situations they attempt to cover, thus, still leaving much to a trial court’s
discretion.166 As a matter of commercial policy and jurisprudence, the
unpredictable result is a disturbing reality for the contracting parties, litigants, and
society.

160. See, e.g., Russell W. Coff, Human Assets and Management Dilemmas: Coping with
Hazards on the Road to Resource-Based Theory, 22 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 374 (1997).
161. Id. at 387.
162. Id. at 388.
163. Id. at 389.
164. Id. at 388; see also Coff, supra note 55, at 119.
165. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 100. See also David J. Teece, Profiting
from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and
Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986).
166. For example, the State of Wisconsin statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West
2002), sets the standard simply at the restrictions being “lawful and enforceable only if the
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer” and states
that “[a]ny covenant . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable
restraint.” See also Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 767 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 2009). In Star Direct
the Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to state:
Restrictive covenants in Wisconsin are prima facie suspect as restraints of
trade that are disfavored at law, and must withstand close scrutiny as to their
reasonableness. They are not to be construed to extend beyond their proper
import or farther than the contract language absolutely requires. Rather, they
are to be construed in favor of the employee.
. . . We have interpreted [the requirements of the statute] as establishing five
prerequisites that a restrictive covenant must meet in order to be enforceable
under Wisconsin law. A restrictive covenant must: (1) be necessary for the
protection of the employer, that is, the employer must have a protectable
interest justifying the restriction imposed on the activity of the employee; (2)
provide a reasonable time limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) not
be harsh or oppressive as to the employee; and (5) not be contrary to public
policy.
Id. at 905 (citations omitted).

2012]

RESOURCE-BASED THEORY & NONCOMPETE LEGITIMACY

1007

Thus, a reasonableness test pervades, but by its nature the test requires courts to
strike a balance among the rights of the individual employee, the employer, and
even the greater public good on a case-by-case basis; it is flawed, however, when it
comes to addressing controversies related to knowledge ownership. As discussed
below in Part III, an approach that uses a principle of knowledge and the
resource-based theory is an antidote to many of these criticisms. In that Part, which
forms the core normative thrust of this Article, the logic of the resource-based
theory of competitive advantage addresses these concerns. Accordingly, we present
an alternative normative principle for evaluating noncompetes.
III. NONCOMPETES AND THE RESOURCE-BASED THEORY
At the root of our discussion of the relationship among noncompete contracts
and competitive advantage is the assertion that ideas—essentially a type of
burgeoning knowledge—are different from other resources which firms may seek
to restrict due to the ethereal nature of knowledge and its relative ease of
disbursement. In other words, the tendency of firms is to treat knowledge related to
their business, in all its forms, as rivalrous (as consumable by that specific firm
alone) or at least excludable (in that they can prevent others from using the
knowledge). The role and limits of noncompetes as a mechanism for firms to keep
and exclusively utilize knowledge for competitive advantage is the subject of this
Part.
Part II of this Article described how neither the reasonableness test nor the
public-interest assessment provides a principled, comprehensive way for courts to
fully balance the firm’s and departing employee’s competing interests. As
mentioned earlier, when the courts evaluate a noncompetition-agreement dispute
they evaluate the reasonableness of the contractual terms restricting the employees
from engaging in their chosen profession. This reasonableness analysis typically
focuses on the geographic area, time, and scope of activity limitations imposed on
the departing employee.167 The reasonableness approach, however, fails to address
how the employer’s legitimate business interest should be assessed, rendering the
reasonableness analysis a secondary question under the framework advanced in this
Article.
To address the challenge, this Part introduces the resource-based theory of
competitive advantage to provide a workable solution to assess the legitimacy of
claims to knowledge in a noncompete. The resource-based theory is widely
recognized in managerial literature and explains why some firms attain competitive
advantage relative to other firms. The theory attributes competitive advantage to the

167. The typical noncompete clause in an employment contract is drafted to specifically
limit competition in terms of geography, duration, and scope of business. One physician
employment contract, for example, reads:
During the term of this Agreement and for twenty-four (24) months after
termination for any reason, Physician shall not, for himself or herself or any
behalf of any other person(s), firm(s), partnership(s), corporation(s) or entity
compete with Corporation in the general practice of medicine within a twenty
(20) mile radius of the Corporation . . . .
Sample Noncompete Clause (on file with the authors).
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economic rents obtained from internal resources and capabilities, and the market
power obtained from the deployment of these resources.168 As evidence of its
importance as a unified theory of the firm and as the ideal of sustainable
competitive advantage, the resource-based theory has been systematically explored
and expanded in the last two decades.169 This includes the addition of specific
typologies for understanding the use of the theory as it relates to competitive
advantage.170
Accordingly, the resource-based theory offers a workable guide for courts to
assess the legitimacy of competing stakeholder claims based on whether the
knowledge in question is a resource that offers sustainable competitive advantage.
The argument advanced here is that the legitimacy of any claims to knowledge will
hinge on whether a party can claim that same knowledge as a resource that provides
sustainable competitive advantage.171
Introducing the concept of competitive advantage into a primarily legal
noncompete analysis is not foreign to the bar and bench. Throughout the remainder
of this Article, the argument will be advanced that the courts and litigants have
already begun to apply concepts related to the resource-based theory of competitive
advantage in the noncompete context, albeit in a way that does not explicitly
recognize the theory outright. Courts and legislatures have discussed the
requirement of a legitimate competitive interest in their decisions examining an
employee’s level of knowledge in noncompete cases.172

168. See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT.
99, 103–05 (1991) (widely cited as the seminal work on the resource-based theory); Robert
M. Grant, The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy
Formulation, 33 CAL. MGMT. REV. 114, 117 (1991) (discussing how the resource-based
theory emphasizes internal resources as the source of strategic advantage, as opposed to the
external environment position advocated by industrial economics).
169. See, e.g., Raphael Amit & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Strategic Assets and
Organizational Rent, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 33 (1993) (advancing resource-based theory
by distinguishing between capabilities and resources, with capabilities referring to the firm’s
capacity to deploy resources); David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic
Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 516 (1997) (building
from the resource-based theory to conceptualize dynamic knowledge-based capabilities as a
strategic resource). But cf. Richard L. Priem & John E. Butler, Is the Resource-Based
“View” a Useful Perspective for Strategic Management Research?, 26 ACAD. OF MGMT.
REV. 22 (2001) (challenging the theoretical foundations of the widely adopted
resource-based view).
170. See generally Margaret A. Peteraf, The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A
Resource-Based View, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 179 (1993) (providing an additional
resource-based model that specifies four conditions).
171. See generally Barney, supra note 168.
172. See, e.g., Kelly Servs. v. Greene, 535 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185–86 (D. Me. 2008). Also,
for instance, the Oregon legislature specifically contemplated substantial management
experience, which can be a resource, as a protectable, competitive business interest. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 653.295(7)(a) (2009).
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A. The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm
The resource-based theory seeks to explain one of the most fundamental aspects
of business: why some firms, over time, exhibit superior performance relative to
other firms.173 The theory ascribes sustainable competitive advantage (sustainable
because the advantage is not temporary) to unique174 resource positions that give a
firm a strategic difference relative to other firms.175 Under the resource-based
theory, a resource offers sustainable competitive advantage only if it is valuable,
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN).176 Resources that possess these
attributes include knowledge-based assets such as trade secrets, processes,
capabilities,177 and legal strategies.178
A resource is valuable if it provides a basis for the firm or individual to conceive
or implement strategies that improve efficiency or effectiveness.179 In the context at
hand, knowledge asserted in a noncompete is assumed to be valuable because of its
use and the employer’s desire to prevent its use by competitors through
enforcement of the contract terms. Resources are rare if they are unique to the firm
or the individual.180 In the resource-based literature, a resource is defined as rare if
it is asset specific.181 Asset-specific resources are those that are differentiated and
include proprietary knowledge-based assets—for example, trade secrets, patents,
and unique methods of doing business.182 Public knowledge and knowledge easily
acquired through independent means stand in direct contrast to asset-specific
knowledge. For example, patented knowledge may provide differentiated
knowledge that is asset specific due to the legal restriction on use during the patent
lifetime. After the patent expires, however, that knowledge ceases to be asset
specific since it becomes part of the public domain.
Inimitable resources are those that cannot be readily observed by competitors or
replicated.183 Resources may be inimitable because they rely on tacit knowledge,
which reflects personal skills, habits, and values among individuals.184 Tacit
knowledge, on the whole, is hard to articulate and therefore hard to replicate.185
Knowledge-based assets may also be inimitable because the firm employs coping

173. Barney, supra note 168, at 100–01.
174. The language of the resource-based theory often uses the word heterogeneous to
contrast resources that are homogenous, or widely shared among firms, and, therefore, not a
source of sustainable competitive advantage. See id. at 103–05.
175. See id. at 105–12. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
(1980).
176. Barney, supra note 168, at 106–12.
177. See Teece et al., supra note 169, at 516–17.
178. See Bagley, supra note 21; Orozco, supra note 21.
179. Barney, supra note 168, at 106.
180. See id. at 106–07.
181. See, e.g., id.
182. See Teece et al., supra note 169, at 516.
183. See Barney, supra note 168, at 107.
184. See Ikujiro Nonaka, A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation, 5
ORG. SCI. 14, 16 (1994).
185. See infra Part III.B.
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mechanisms to prevent knowledge spillovers.186 Some of these managerial coping
mechanisms involve profit sharing, shared governance and investments in specific
skills that tie employees to the firm.187 The firm may additionally use legal
mechanisms to enhance inimitability; intellectual property rights such as patents,
trade secrets, copyrights, designs, and trademarks offer legal exclusivity to
knowledge resources.188 As discussed previously, contracts such as nondisclosure
agreements or noncompetes are also used to expand the level of inimitability.189
Finally, a resource is nonsubstitutable if competitors may not easily find similar
ways to develop or acquire acceptable alternatives to the resource.190 Resources are
often difficult to substitute when they are embedded in socially complex systems or
relationships.191 An inimitable aspect of business-related knowledge is
management’s ability to coordinate knowledge among individuals and disparate
groups through what are called higher-order organizing principles.192 Higher-order
organizational principles involve managerial insights and leadership to direct
disparate knowledge among individuals and units.193 For example, a promising
research and development project will require support among different business
stakeholders, including top management, marketing, sales, and finance personnel,
among others. Such principles are required to coordinate the knowledge held by
these various groups to ensure that the project moves forward successfully.194
Higher-order organizational principles are also associated with coordinating
knowledge-based managerial routines in a way that cannot be easily unpacked to
identify cause-and-effect relationships, making them difficult to replicate by
would-be imitators.195
To summarize, under the resource-based theory, resources yield sustainable
competitive advantage only when they are conjunctively valuable, rare, inimitable,
and non-substitutable.196 In today’s information-based economy, knowledge-based
assets are resources that firms and individuals increasingly rely on to establish a
competitive market position. Knowledge is, therefore, increasingly relied upon by
organizations to sustain advantage and generate differentiation vis-à-vis
competitors.

186. See Coff, supra note 55, at 380–93.
187. See id.
188. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 100.
189. See supra Part II.A.
190. See Barney, supra note 168, at 111.
191. See, e.g., Barney, supra note 168.
192. See Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities,
and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383, 389 (1992).
193. See id. at 389–90.
194. See David Orozco, Rational Design Rights Ignorance, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 573 (2009)
(discussing legal knowledge of several intellectual property rights as a coordinating principle
to unite various business activities within a firm to achieve the goal of integrated intellectual
property rights); see also Orozco, supra note 21 (discussing managerial leadership as a
requirement to generate the strategic resource of legal knowledge).
195. See Kogut & Zander, supra note 192.
196. See Barney, supra note 168.
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Many types of knowledge can be secured under existing law, for example, the
intellectual property laws that extend to trade secrets, patents, copyrights, designs,
and trademarks. There are additional types of knowledge, however, that are not
secured by the formal intellectual property regimes, and, given the practical
realities faced within organizations cannot be realistically secured as a trade
secret.197 Some knowledge cannot be secured by trade secret because of the
requirement that the information be subject to reasonable efforts to preserve its
secrecy.198 This category of information may include business strategies,199 pricing
information,200 customer-related knowledge,201 and confidential customer lists.202 In
these cases, the firm can rely on noncompetes as a realistic method to protect this
unique category of knowledge against unwanted spillovers.
Taking reasonable steps to preserve secrecy can be difficult to achieve in all
cases where information is being created for two reasons. First, the value of the
knowledge may not be apparent until well after its creation or dissemination.203
Without a clear value of the knowledge ex ante, it is difficult to determine if it is
worth expending resources to preserve secrecy. For this reason, some of the
knowledge building blocks that led to the creation of subsequent knowledge may
remain unsecured after their value becomes apparent ex post.
Second, knowledge is often shared among parties to communicate its value and
to generate additional value if external sources of knowledge must be integrated.204

197. Trade secrets, however, may be a factor to determine whether a noncompete is
enforced. See, e.g., The Hamilton-Ryker Group, LLC v. Keymon, No. W2008-00936-COAR3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (holding that the
violation of a noncompete was partially attributable to the former employees unauthorized
use of company trade secrets).
198. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) [hereinafter U.T.S.A.].
199. See Kelly Servs. v. Eidnes, 530 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Kelly
Servs., Inc. v. Noretto, 495 F. Supp. 2d 645, 657 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (stating that employers
have an interest in protecting such confidential information such as marketing strategies and
sales strategies or techniques).
200. See Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding
that although pricing generally may be protectable, a court needs look at the specific pricing
at issue in the case to determine whether the company protected that pricing).
201. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding
that a noncompete may be enforceable to protect the former employer’s training related to
client-specific knowledge).
202. See, e.g., St. Clair Med., P.C. v. Borgiel, 715 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Mich. Ct. App.
2006); Godlan, Inc. v. Whiteford, No. 227696, 2003 WL 1094114 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 11,
2003). The courts are also hesitant to extend trade secret protection to general, managerial
knowledge such as marketing plans and costing or pricing information unless this managerial
knowledge is identifiable and confidential. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp.
2d 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
203. This supply challenge related to knowledge transfer is often referred to as Arrow’s
information paradox, in reference to economist Kenneth Arrow, who first exposed the
challenge. KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (1971).
204. See Sw. Stainless, 582 F.3d 1176 (holding, in a non-compete case, that pricing
information could be a trade secret but plaintiff had failed to establish it in the case at hand
since the pricing information had been shared with clients without imposing confidentiality
restrictions). Also, under a leading theory of knowledge management, knowledge held by
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Businesses are collaborating with external parties with greater frequency in an era
characterized by open innovation and business models.205 It is often impractical for
a company to guard its knowledge with legal mechanisms in an open-innovation
context, or when trust and other non-legal mechanisms play a strong role in
mediating the risks of divulging knowledge absent formalized protection.206 This
valuable knowledge, which is not subject to trade secret or other formal intellectual
property protection, may be a true resource nonetheless. In some cases, this
knowledge ownership right may be legitimately enforced with a noncompete. Firms
will naturally seek to develop several layers of knowledge-asset protection and,
where permitted by state law and public policy, the noncompete offers a low-cost
protective mechanism for employers.207
B. The Resource-Based Theory Applied to Firms and Employee Knowledge
Because the resource-based theory defines the necessary conditions for a
knowledge-based resource to offer sustainable competitive advantage, this theory
provides suitable grounding to assess the legitimacy of competing claims to
knowledge in a noncompete. Firms and individuals can generate sustainable
competitive advantage only through the creation and deployment of resources that
meet the VRIN criteria specified by the resource-based theory. The assertion is that
a firm’s protectable knowledge interest is legitimate only if the knowledge meets
these criteria. Knowledge that is not a resource that provides sustainable
competitive advantage is knowledge that can be readily purchased or replaced in a
market transaction. Restricting knowledge flows and employee mobility by
granting a limited duration monopoly for a knowledge-based asset that can be
readily purchased or substituted in the marketplace208 offers unfair advantage akin
to rent-seeking that, as a matter of policy, should not be allowed via judicial
noncompete enforcement.
The argument that readily available, or easily acquired, knowledge should not be
privately owned finds support in another prominent area of information regulation:
the intellectual property laws. The patent laws, for example, exclude from
patentability any invention that is obvious or otherwise not novel.209 A trademark
various individuals must be combined to generate new knowledge, therefore, increasing the
incentive to share knowledge with others. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139.
205. HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW
INNOVATION LANDSCAPE, at xiii (2006) (discussing how open innovation “means that
companies should make much greater use of external ideas and technologies in their own
business, while letting their unused ideas be used by other companies”).
206. See Sw. Stainless, 582 F.3d 1176; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (this is widely
recognized as a seminal work in the theory of relational contracts, a theory that places trust,
norms, and other non-legal mechanisms in a contractual context). Also, general agency law
may further explain this since the firm may not seek to extend trade secret protection to
knowledge because it relies on the duty of loyalty of its agents-employees. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
207. See generally Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 47.
208. An asset that is readily purchased in the marketplace is not a VRIN resource. See
Teece et al., supra note 169, at 517.
209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006).

2012]

RESOURCE-BASED THEORY & NONCOMPETE LEGITIMACY

1013

cannot be federally registered if the mark is not distinctive relative to other words
or marks.210 Product designs must also be novel to justify registration.211 Trade
secret law extends protection only to valuable information that is not readily
available.212 Copyright, likewise, does not extend to publicly known facts.213 The
public policy behind these various information-regulating laws is to prevent private
ownership of what ought to rightfully remain in the public domain.214 Along those
lines, a noncompete should not, as a matter of public policy, extend to knowledge
that is widely or generally available in the market. As will be further discussed
below, this contention finds ample support in the resource-based theory.
The departing employee’s knowledge may be valuable and rare (VR), yet it may
be easily imitated or substituted if the employee leaves the firm and transfers that
knowledge to a competitor or uses it to start a competing enterprise.215 This reason
serves as a partial justification for allowing companies to use a noncompete to
restrict knowledge transfer. It also places a burden on companies to extract a VRIN
knowledge resource from its employees. The firm must use the employee’s
knowledge and take extra steps to ensure that this individual, personal knowledge
becomes a VRIN organizational resource that is inimitable and non-substitutable
under the resource-based theory. This presents a challenge, however, since the
employee retains the knowledge and is mobile. As described next, the firm can take
steps to overcome this hurdle and ensure that the knowledge retain the “sticky”
attributes of inimitable and non-substitutable organizational knowledge. When the
firm takes the extra steps to transform the employee’s knowledge into a VRIN
organizational resource that offers sustainable competitive advantage, the firm has
acquired a legitimate, protectable interest that may be properly enforced with the
assistance of a noncompete clause.
An analysis of the claims to employee knowledge, when assessed from the
resource-based theory, requires understanding how a firm converts employee
knowledge that is valuable and rare into one that has all the above-mentioned
VRIN properties. Strategic organizational research offers useful insights to
theoretically assess the mechanisms firms use to convert employee knowledge into

210. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
211. See 35 U.S.C. § 171.
212. See U.T.S.A. § 1(4). The U.T.S.A defines a trade secret as,
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. (emphasis added).
213. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that a
principle of U.S. copyright law is that “information” is not copyrightable, but “collections”
of information can be).
214. See A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual
Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 49–59 (2002) (discussing the various
rationales for preserving the public domain among various intellectual property law
regimes).
215. See Coff, supra note 55, at 377.
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a resource that offers sustainable competitive advantage.216 This dynamic process
spans units of analysis, moving from individuals to teams, and integrates different
types of knowledge, including public knowledge, private knowledge, tacit
knowledge, explicit knowledge, and organizational routines.
The following discussion draws from knowledge management literature to
explain how firms transform employees’ individual, intellectual capital into
strategic organizational knowledge that has the VRIN-resource properties. This
movement involves a knowledge taxonomy involving three continuums recognized
in the knowledge management literature: (1) public-private knowledge; (2) tacitexplicit knowledge; and (3) individual-organizational knowledge.217
1. Public-Private Knowledge
Public knowledge, by virtue of its general availability, does not confer
sustainable competitive advantage according to the resource-based theory.218 Public
knowledge may be a factor of production, defined as undifferentiated knowledge
that is not specific to the firm and that can be readily purchased in factor
markets.219 As a factor of production, general knowledge may be valuable, but by
itself it cannot offer differentiation or long-term strategic advantage.220 The reason
why is because under the resource-based theory, general knowledge is not rare or
asset-specific. Private knowledge, on the other hand, is by definition specific to the
firm and can take the form of trade secrets and idiosyncratic know-how, skills,
values, and routines. Private knowledge may offer sustainable competitive
advantage if it satisfies the other VRIN conditions.
2. Tacit-Explicit Knowledge
The knowledge management literature distinguishes between tacit and explicit
knowledge.221 Tacit knowledge is personal knowledge that cannot be fully
explained and relates to experience, skills, values, and learned habits.222 It is often
said about tacit knowledge that we know more than we can say.223 For example, a
pitcher would find it difficult to precisely articulate how they are able to pitch a
fastball.224 A good deal of tacit knowledge underlies explicit knowledge. On the
other hand, explicit knowledge, such as data and information, is codified and easy

216. See id.
217. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 149, at 683–85.
218. See id. at 683–84.
219. See Teece et al., supra note 169, at 516.
220. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 149, at 683–84.
221. See, e.g., id. at 683.
222. See id.
223. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (1966).
224. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 63–64 (discussing the case of a newproduct-development team working with a master baker to develop a home-bakery device.
The product development team spent time with the master baker but gained a critical insight
only after spending time watching the master baker perform a task that was never explicitly
stated as a key step in the baking process).
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to speak of, replicate, and transmit.225 As stated by one well-known commentator,
knowledge requires combining tacit experiential knowledge with explicit
information or data: “Data when compiled can become information. Information,
when combined with experience, becomes knowledge. On their own, data and
information do not represent knowledge. It is the internalization of information that
turns it into knowledge.”226
According to a widely held perspective, new knowledge is created when
individuals learn from one another and share their tacit knowledge in a group
setting to develop hypotheses using abductive reasoning.227 This intuitive
knowledge may then be validated and amplified within an organization when it is
recorded and formalized into explicit knowledge, for example novel business
heuristics or strategies, techniques, processes, or inventions.228
3. Organizational-Individual Knowledge
Organizational knowledge is regarded as a resource that can offer a sustainable
competitive advantage.229 According to managerial scholars, higher-order
organizing principles are a type of high-level knowledge used by top managers to
coordinate resources and yield a novel strategy or business logic.230 For example,
the Apple Corporation uses a unique strategy to integrate research and
development, industrial design, manufacturing, and marketing to obtain layers of
intellectual property rights, particularly trade dress rights related to its product
shapes.231 This type of knowledge must be embedded in the organization among
various top managers and is often composed of strategies, values, and high-level
decision-making mental models232 or heuristics. At the opposite end of
organizational knowledge is individual knowledge, which is the starting point for
learning in any organization.233 According to a prominent strategic-knowledge
theory, individual knowledge can be extracted, embedded, and formalized as
organizational knowledge in the form of a process or routine.234 This
knowledge-based routine can, in turn, become a core competence.235 A core

225. See id. at 59.
226. JULIE L. DAVIS & SUZANNE HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING
COMPANIES REALIZE VALUE FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS 115 (2001) (quoting Karl
Eric Sveiby, Professor of Knowledge Management at the Hanken Business School in
Helsinki, Finland and author of numerous books on managing tacit knowledge).
227. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 64.
228. These strategies can be managerial and legal strategies. For a discussion of legal
knowledge as a foundation for strategic behavior, see Orozco, supra note 21.
229. See Kogut & Zander, supra note 192, at 384.
230. See e.g., id. at 389–90.
231. See Orozco, supra note 21, at 720–21; Orozco, supra note 194, at 603–04.
232. See C. K. Prahalad & Richard A. Bettis, The Dominant Logic: A New Linkage
Between Diversity and Performance, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 485, 489–90 (1986).
233. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139.
234. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
235. See Teece et al., supra note 139, at 516.
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competence is any distinctive activity that defines a firm’s fundamental business
and is composed of strategic processes and unique asset positions.236
The public-private and tacit-explicit knowledge continuums discussed above
extend to individual and organizational knowledge. For example, an individual may
obtain public knowledge when they obtain data, information, training, or skills that
are commonly available.237 An employee who obtains general software training or
foreign language proficiency obtains public knowledge. Alternatively, the
employee may develop a unique skill that is private, or idiosyncratic, for example,
knowledge of a novel formula or process. Likewise, individuals possess tacit
knowledge such as experience, know-how, and skills such as the ability to
successfully network with other professionals. Individuals also acquire explicit
knowledge that can be easily communicated to others, such as the ability to prepare
a report on their subject of expertise or create financial models.
Along similar lines, organizational knowledge may be public, such as industry
best practices. For example, knowledge of best practices, such as total quality
management (TQM), just-in-time inventory management, or six-sigma are publicknowledge skills available to organizations.238 Organizational knowledge may also
be private, for example, if the organization engages in routines that use organizing
principles to coordinate activities in an effective manner that are not easily imitated
by competitors and otherwise confidential. Tacit organizational knowledge reflects
the organization’s values and culture, whereas explicit organizational knowledge
reflects identifiable processes or systems, such as an internal, company-specific
compliance training program.
C. Four Generalized Knowledge Scenarios To Determine Noncompete Legitimacy
The noncompete is a contractual mechanism that, in a fairly broad and blunt
manner, restricts knowledge flows and employee mobility. The objective is to
constrain employee knowledge produced within a complex and dynamic
environment involving employees interacting in an organizational setting.239
Knowledge, however, as discussed above, flows in multiple directions and across
organizational and even ontological levels.240 Yet, the reasonableness test glosses
over these important distinctions.241
To provide a better portrait of knowledge produced within an organization,
Figure 1 depicts how the competing-knowledge claims between employers and
employees may be analytically mapped using the resource-based theory. Figure 1
illustrates four scenarios that arise when departing employees and employers assert

236. See id.
237. See generally Rubin & Shedd, supra note 54 (discussing the differences between
general and specific human capital and the role of noncompetes in employer investments in
employee training).
238. See Matusik & Hill, supra note 149, at 683.
239. See DiMatteo, supra note 14, at 765–66 (mentioning some reasons employer’s use
noncompetes; however, he continues to discuss the potential abuse of a noncompete as
strategic coercion, particularly when the clause is clearly unenforceable).
240. See NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 56–57.
241. See supra Part II.
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a protectable knowledge interest. The unit of analysis in this figure is knowledge
that the former employee gained during the course of employment with the firm
and that was combined, if at all, with the firm’s knowledge-based infrastructure to
generate a valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable knowledge resource. To
illustrate this concept, the next subparts discuss each of the four discrete scenarios
using this analysis.
Figure 1: Four Knowledge Scenarios: Firm Knowledge Versus Employee
Knowledge

The Firm’s Knowledge

The
Individual’s
Knowledge

Not VRIN

VRIN

VRIN

C. EmployeeOwned
Knowledge

D. Disputed
Knowledge

Not VRIN

A. Public
Knowledge

B. Firm-Owned
Knowledge

1. Scenario A—Public Knowledge
In this scenario, the individual draws from publicly available knowledge to
augment their human capital—for example, learning a general software skill. As an
employee, however, the individual uses general knowledge and combines it with
organizational knowledge that is also easily obtained, purchased, or replicated. An
example of easily obtained organizational knowledge would be the implemented
knowledge of a standardized accounting system. Since public knowledge is not
asset-specific or idiosyncratic, it cannot be rare, and thus cannot offer the individual
or the firm sustainable competitive advantage. If a noncompete is being asserted in
these cases, it would be a clear example of the firm overreaching and trying to limit
competition by rent-seeking through judicial enforcement.242
There is ample precedent already in the laws of several states to uphold the idea
that generally known information is not a legitimate protectable interest. In Florida,

242. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980) (discussing and reviewing
various rent-seeking behaviors, which are defined as socially inefficient activities undertaken
by individuals seeking a transfer of wealth via a state-sanctioned activity).
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for example, the District Court of Appeals for the Second District held that an
employer’s investment in employee training was not a legitimate protectable
interest, even though the amount of training was significant.243 The reason for
denying the employer relief under the asserted covenant not to compete was
because the employee’s training, although significant, was not extraordinary since
it did not involve anything beyond what was generally available to similar
employees in other companies.244 The court stated that “[t]o constitute a protectable
interest, however, the providing of training or education must be extraordinary.
‘Extraordinary’ is that which goes beyond what is usual, regular, common, or
customary in the industry in which the employee is employed.”245
In another case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that an
employer did not meet the burden of establishing a legitimate business interest
when the company asserted an interest in the former employee’s training.246 In that
case, the court stated the following applicable rule: “When the skills and
information acquired by a former employee are of a general managerial nature,
such as supervisory, merchandising, purchasing and advertising skills and
information, a restrictive covenant in an employment contract will not be enforced
because such skills and information are not protectible [sic] employer interests.”247
2. Scenario B—Firm-Owned Knowledge
In this case, the firm has a legitimate interest in private organizational
knowledge that is either tacit or explicit. The firm’s tacit knowledge is
organizational knowledge that is shared by various employees and that is personal
and experiential.248 Tacit organizational knowledge often relates to the values held
by individuals in the organization and may generate a unique culture specific to that
organization.249 As discussed by managerial scholars, corporate culture may be a
resource that sustains competitive advantage since culture is tacit and difficult to
discern and replicate.250
However, in the case of defining the legitimacy of this business resource, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for one employee to appropriate the
firm’s tacit knowledge related to the firm’s culture. The definition of corporate
culture implies social phenomena and the inability to precisely articulate the nature
or origin of that culture.251 Because knowledge of corporate culture resides among
various individuals and is not easily communicated, it is likely to remain a VRIN
organizational resource in spite of the actions taken by one departing employee. For
these reasons, even though the corporation has a legitimate interest in the corporate

243. Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 129–32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
244. Id. at 132.
245. Id.
246. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Foppiano, 382 S.E.2d 499, 501–02 (W. Va. 1989).
247. Id. (quoting Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady, 297 S.E.2d 840, 843 (W. Va. 1982)).
248. Matusik & Hill, supra note 149, at 683–84.
249. Id. at 683.
250. See Peter Meso & Robert Smith, A Resource-Based View of Organizational
Knowledge Management Systems, 4 J. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. 224, 225 (2000).
251. Id. at 232–33.
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culture expressed as tacit knowledge that is held by various employees, it is not a
legitimate protectable interest when asserted against any one departing employee
through a noncompete.
In another scenario, however, the firm does have a legitimate interest in private
organizational knowledge that is explicit and held among various individuals as a
routine or strategy. That interest would outweigh any employee’s interest or claim
if the employee simply learned about the organizational routine or knowledge-asset
and did not contribute knowledge that was unique. For instance, imagine a scenario
where a former employee learned of explicit organizational knowledge with VRIN
attributes such as a novel marketing strategy and exercised general managerial
skills and knowledge to execute this strategy without contributing any new
knowledge. In this case the firm would have a legitimate protectable interest in
preventing the ex-employee from disclosing or using the information
postemployment. In this example, the marketing department’s strategy would be
explicit organizational knowledge since it had been recorded in some manner and
shared among various employees.
In addition, confidential existing customer lists are another frequently litigated
knowledge resource.252 If the list is a source of private explicit knowledge that is
shared within the organization to confer advantage, it would also provide the firm
with a legitimate claim against the former employee who may attempt to use the
list.253 For example, in the case of DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, a New York
trial court enforced a noncompete against senior executives relying in part on the
fact that these executives had been exposed to the long-term strategic knowledge
found in DoubleClick’s business plan and had used the explicit, private
(confidential) and organizational knowledge contained in the business plan to
develop the business plan for their competing start-up enterprise.254
3. Scenario C—Employee-Owned Knowledge
The departing employee may have a protectable interest in private knowledge
that is tacit or explicit. An individual may possess tacit knowledge such as knowhow, values, experience, and skills that are difficult to articulate, such as the ability
to quickly organize information. Under a widely accepted theory of organizational
learning,255 organizations obtain new knowledge when individuals combine their

252. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525,
532–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61
(2d Cir. 1984)) (ultimately finding that the plaintiff did not show that the defendants had
taken the actual customer lists; however, the court stated, “Irreparable harm to an employer
may also result where an employee has misappropriated trade secrets or confidential
customer information, including pricing methods, customer lists and customer
preferences.”).
253. See House of Tools & Eng’g, Inc. v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (holding in favor of an employer because the former employee “became acquainted
with plaintiff's customers and was given extensive information on each customer”).
254. DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 7, 1997).
255. NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 62–63.
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tacit knowledge to yield an insight that is eventually transformed into explicit
knowledge.256 Organizations embed this learning and reproduce it by formalizing
the explicit knowledge as a process or routine that becomes part of organizational
memory, which is managed using higher-order organizing principles.257 If the
organization fails to manage this process of transitioning the employee’s
knowledge from tacit to explicit, the organization cannot formalize the learning or
embed it as a routine that others in the organization can adopt, follow, or learn
from.258 Also, an employee’s individual tacit knowledge is highly personal
knowledge that is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the individual. Tacit
individual knowledge is only effective as a strategic knowledge resource if it is
transformed into, and combined with, explicit organizational knowledge. Absent
any effort shown by the firm to convert personal knowledge into organizational
knowledge, the departing employee’s claim to tacit individual knowledge should
prevail over the former employer’s claim.
There are cases when the employee develops individual explicit knowledge
during the term of employment and would retain a legitimate ownership interest to
this knowledge. This occurs when the employee’s explicit knowledge was never
shared with other individuals or implemented in the organization as a routine.
There are a few scenarios when this may plausibly occur. First, an employee may
develop specialized explicit knowledge when operating as a type of consultant with
a limited role in the organization. A consultant offers specialized expertise for
discrete issues that may remain isolated to the activities solely performed by that
individual.
For example, a software engineer hired as a temporary employee may develop
software code that confers advantage to the engineer. In this case, however, the
software engineer may never be called upon to share or embed that knowledge
beyond a narrowly defined software project. From a resource-based perspective, the
software engineer has a knowledge resource that does not confer the organization
with sustainable competitive advantage since the knowledge at that point lacks
social complexity; that is, it was not combined with other knowledge assets and is
not embedded as an explicit routine using higher-order organizing principles.259

256. This process involves employees from different backgrounds sharing what are called
“mental models.” See id.
257. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 234.
258. NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 69–70; Meso & Smith, supra note 250, at
232–33. It is not unjust or uncommon to require companies to take additional steps to obtain
a valid property interest to knowledge assets produced within the firm. Trade secret law, for
example, requires companies to take reasonable steps to insure that the information remains
secret.
259. The firm may have required the software engineer to sign a separate contractual
clause related to the assignment of inventions, or a work-made-for-hire agreement. The
theoretical employment scenario described here involves the absence of such provisions. In
the absence of an assignment contract, the employee and employer share the patentable
rights, with the employee having full rights to the patentable invention and the employer
having “shop rights,” which basically provides the employer with a nonexclusive,
nontransferable and royalty-free license to practice the invention. United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 196 (1933).
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Given the increase of the segment of the labor force acting on a temporary or
contingent basis, this scenario may prove increasingly common.
Another example may be labeled the case of a frustrated entrepreneur. In this
case, an employee, or group of employees, develops knowledge that is believed to
yield VRIN attributes. There is the possibility, however, that the knowledge will
never be commercialized260 for a number of reasons, including inertia, information
asymmetries, risk aversion, or legitimacy struggles.261 When this occurs, the
individuals have contributed to the explicit knowledge that the firm never
implemented. These individuals, therefore, may depart the firm and under the
framework adopted here have a legitimate claim to the knowledge. In this case, the
firm’s claim to the individual explicit knowledge generated by these former
employees is moderated by its inability to turn the former employee’s knowledge
into organizational knowledge and an element of sustainable competitive
advantage.
A counterargument is that, under agency principles, these former employees
owed a duty of loyalty to the firm during the knowledge-creation process and,
therefore, the explicit knowledge they created is owed to the firm-principal.262
Although this may be appealing in a formalistic sense, in practice it offers a
distorted and unbalanced treatment of knowledge creation in an information era. A
pragmatic solution263 is offered by the resource-based theory since it defines and
limits the scope of legitimate claims made by both the employee-agent and the
firm-principal. As applied to the two scenarios discussed above, an analysis based
on the resource-based theory would come out in favor of granting a knowledgebased property right to the former employee(s) if the firm fails to embed that
knowledge as part of its organizational knowledge. Any indication that the
employees knowingly withheld information or transferred it to another competing
organization may be properly addressed under fiduciary duty or fraud doctrines.
4. Scenario D—Disputed Ownership
A difficult scenario arises when both the departing employee and the firm have a
legitimate protectable interest to knowledge from the perspective of the resourcebased theory. These scenarios occur when the individual contributed explicit, assetspecific knowledge that was successfully combined with other sources of
knowledge controlled by the firm and that was managed using higher-order
organizing principles. Under these circumstances, both the former employee and

260. The commercialization of knowledge can include taking a product or service to
market or licensing the knowledge to a third party, such as in the case of patent, copyright, or
trade secret licensing.
261. See generally Howard E. Aldrich & C. Marlene Fiol, Fools Rush In? The
Institutional Context of Industry Creation, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 645 (1994).
262. See Stone, supra note 28, at 738.
263. Judge-driven, pragmatic adjustments to legal doctrine in response to changing social
realities have been a recognized cornerstone of the American common law ever since the
Legal Realists first expounded this anti-formalistic approach. See generally JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Brian H. Bix, ed., 2009); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1946) (1881).
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the company contributed to the development of a combined knowledge asset with
VRIN properties that yields sustainable competitive advantage.
The fact that the explicit individual knowledge was combined with other assetspecific knowledge controlled by the firm demonstrates that the firm took the steps
necessary to promote learning throughout the organization. It may also indicate that
higher-order organizing principles were used to combine the knowledge with other
strategic resources to generate higher-order business logic. The value of the
knowledge is confirmed if it becomes part of an organizational process or
routine.264 All of these actions are involved with organizational learning265 and
indicate a knowledge resource that has the VRIN attributes.266 As discussed in the
following section, in cases where both parties have a legitimate claim to
knowledge, the courts will have to further assess the nature of the parties’ behavior
and the reasonableness of the contract’s restrictive terms.
IV. A DECISION PATH TO ASCERTAIN THE LEGITIMACY OF A NONCOMPETE
This section offers the courts a decision-path267 framework that synthesizes the
resource-based theory approach to employee knowledge in a disputed ownership
scenario. The decision path depicted in Figure 2 provides the courts with a
workable and principled method to initially, as a threshold matter, assess the
legitimacy of claims to employee knowledge in a noncompete.

264. Teece et al., supra note 169, at 516.
265. NONAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 139, at 62–90.
266. See infra Part III.A.
267. A decision path or tree represents an algorithm, or process, and is depicted as a
series of choices with associated risks, results and probabilities. See Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com.
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Figure 2: Decision-Tree Framework To Assess the Legitimacy of Noncompetes
Covenant Not to
Compete (CNC)
Asserted

Is the
Knowledge
Public?

Yes

No

No CNC

Proceed

Is the
Knowledge
Tacit or
Explicit?

Tacit

Explicit

No CNC

Proceed

Is the
Knowledge
Socially
Complex?

No

Yes
No CNC

The Court may
enforce the CNC if
Reasonable

A. Framework Application
This discussion follows the levels of analysis that a court would engage in to
assess the legitimacy of the claims to knowledge made by the litigants. In these
circumstances, imposing the initial burden on the plaintiff-employer to factually
and specifically allege that the departing employee’s knowledge is private, explicit,
and organizationally complex as detailed in the decision-path framework is
recommended as a requirement to sustain a cause of action during the pleading
stages.268

268. See, e.g., California’s Code of Civil Procedure related to trade secrets requiring that
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The precise pleading requirements advocated under the resource-based approach
may ameliorate the problem of vague pleading by defendants in cases involving
employee-held knowledge. It is commonly stated by practitioners that plaintiffs
strategically engage in vague pleading in the related area of trade secret litigation269
and that the courts have widely varying specificity standards with regards to trade
secret pleading.270 According to some commentators, this variation results in
unpredictable outcomes, subjectivity, and overreaching, as is often the case in
noncompete cases.271
1. Public vs. Private Knowledge
The analysis begins when a firm asks the court to uphold their exclusive claim
to knowledge in the noncompete, usually by requesting a preliminary injunction or,
if the employee has begun working for the competitor, a temporary restraining
order forbidding the former employee from continuing to work for that competitor.
Following this, the court can initially determine from the pleadings whether the
knowledge in question is public or private.272 If it is apparent that the knowledge is
a plaintiff identify its alleged trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” before that party
can commence discovery on its claims based upon trade secret misappropriation. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2011). Other statutes are less rigorous in their requirement for
particularity; however, they still require that the plaintiff plead the existence of a protectable
interest. For example, Florida’s noncompete statute states:
The person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant shall plead and prove
the existence of one or more legitimate business interests justifying the
restrictive covenant. The term “legitimate business interest” includes, but is not
limited to:
1. Trade secrets, as defined in s. 688.002(4).
2. Valuable confidential business or professional information that otherwise
does not qualify as trade secrets.
3. Substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers,
patients, or clients.
4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated with:
a. An ongoing business or professional practice, by way of trade name,
trademark, service mark, or “trade dress”;
b. A specific geographic location; or
c. A specific marketing or trade area.
5. Extraordinary or specialized training.
Any restrictive covenant not supported by a legitimate business interest is
unlawful and is void and unenforceable.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b) (West 2010). States vary in their application of
the initial burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of a noncompete. Some
states, like Arizona, Illinois, Ohio, and Mississippi impose the initial burden on the
employer, whereas other states, like Connecticut, impose the initial burden of
proof on the employee.
269. Charles T. Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secret Claims in
Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 68, 68
(2006).
270. Id. at 69.
271. Id.
272. See supra Part III.C.
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public, the court may determine that it is not a VRIN resource and grant the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, thus refusing to enforce the
contract.273 If this were the case, the court would uphold the public interest and
prevent any private party from restricting competition via rent-seeking. This policy
would also protect the public interest in furthering intellectual capital mobility and
the freedom of individuals to engage in their chosen trade or profession without
hindrance by firms exploiting a financial advantage.
2. Tacit vs. Explicit Knowledge
If the court finds the knowledge is private, it will continue its analysis and
determine next whether the knowledge is tacit or explicit.274 Explicit knowledge
may take many forms, for example, written materials, memos, presentations,
reports, lists, and statistical compilations. The court should, therefore, place the
burden on the employer to specifically identify in the pleadings the precise nature
of the knowledge being claimed.275 If the knowledge is tacit, and therefore vaguely
identified,276 the judge may infer, using the resource-based theory as justification,
that the knowledge cannot be used by the departing employee to disadvantage the
firm for the reasons described earlier.277 If the departing employee’s knowledge is
tacit and vaguely described, the court may likewise grant the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the employer failed to meet the burden of
establishing a legitimate protectable interest.
3. Organizational vs. Individual Knowledge
Assuming that the former employee’s knowledge is private, identifiable, and
explicit, the court will lastly determine whether the knowledge has social
(organizational) complexity.278 Social, that is, organizational, complexity can be
assessed by two evidentiary queries: (1) whether the former employee’s knowledge
was combined with other sources of the firm’s explicit knowledge to promote
learning; and (2) whether the former employee’s knowledge was coordinated
within the firm using higher-order organizing principles.279 Examples involving
these factors are offered next.

273. Id. (discussing cases where state courts have held that generally available
information is not a legitimate protectable business interest).
274. See supra Part III.B.
275. See Graves & Range, supra note 269, at 79–80.
276. For example, unacceptably vague trade secret claims make reference to general
categories such as “pricing strategy and policies,” “ratio of ingredients,” “confidential
materials,” “confidential suppliers,” and “customer lists” among other things. Graves &
Range, supra note 269, at 85–86. Any of these categories may include protectable
knowledge and may be enforced with a noncompete, however, as long as they are clearly
identified as a resource under the framework advanced here.
277. See supra Part III.B–C.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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Organizational learning occurs when an employee interacts with other
employees and shares knowledge in a team setting.280 If the team is crossdisciplinary, there is an added presumption of learning since this type of learning
requires extra effort and planning.281 In the case of Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,282 a
former employee (Highsmith) was prevented from joining a competitor because he
possessed knowledge that that was transferred across departments within the
Lumex organization.283 As stated by the judge in that case: “The Court finds that
Highsmith, as the Lumex Worldwide Marketing Manager and an engineer by
training, had a wide range of duties, including marketing and product management.
He interacted with virtually every part of the company, including sales,
engineering, marketing, manufacturing and research and development.”284
The court also found that it was relevant that Mr. Highsmith had gained
knowledge from customers and also had attended high-level strategic policy
meetings with other top executives in the organization. On this point, the court said
the following about Mr. Highsmith:
He attended high level policy designing, marketing and financial
meetings. Highsmith was not a salesman, or a sales representative, or a
sales manager and did not service or solicit Cybex customers. However,
he occasionally interacted with some customers to obtain “feedback”
and in connection with his other duties. His job was to interpret the
market and the market needs and relate it to the Cybex products.
Highsmith attended all the trade shows, that are so important in this
industry. He interacted and worked closely with Roy Simonson, the
Lumex Chief Designer, who the Court finds to be a credible witness,
and Highsmith was a sounding board for Simonson with regard to the
25 to 40 Cybex products. . . . Highsmith was privy to discussions
involving future Cybex markets, products on the drawing board and
new prototypes, was a member of the elite strategic planning committee
together with the top personnel of Cybex and attended high level
meetings in which future restructuring of Cybex was discussed,
together with detailed financial information, including costs and Lumex
profit margins.285
The courts may, as in this instance, find that credible evidence that the former
employee shared knowledge with other employees and even customers and
attended strategic or planning meetings to disseminate identifiable knowledge is
persuasive evidence that the departing employee’s knowledge is organizational in
nature.286 Thus, in this instance, there is a legitimate reason to enforce an otherwise
properly executed noncompete on the grounds that it covers a protectable interest of
the employer.

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See Orozco, supra note 21, at 698.
See generally id.
919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 629–30.
Id. at 629–30, 633.

2012]

RESOURCE-BASED THEORY & NONCOMPETE LEGITIMACY

1027

Courts can also infer organizational learning from high-level managerial
techniques that transform knowledge into strategic advantage.287 These techniques
include designing incentives and organizational structures to maximize employee
performance and knowledge transfers within an organization.288 One such
technique may involve transferring an employee to another division to complement
or expand the employee’s skill set and the organization’s knowledge base.289
Another technique is to include the employee in a cross-functional group that
develops strategies through knowledge sharing.290 This is done to augment the
employee’s managerial and leadership skills, which complement preexisting
operational knowledge.
In another recent case, the Southern District of New York enforced a
noncompete against a former IBM employee in part because the employee was
exposed to highly confidential information obtained by virtue of the employee’s
membership in an elite management team.291 According to one of the IBM
managers, the members of this highly select team were: “[E]xposed to highly
confidential information regarding IBM’s entire business. The purpose behind such
exposure is to (1) develop corporate strategy, (2) drive innovation and growth, (3)
address firm-wide issues through collaboration across departments, and (4) allow
up-and-coming leaders to gain exposure to all areas of IBM’s business.”292
The court continued and pointed out that the relevant team members “are not
merely given access to highly confidential information, but participate extensively
in programs that are designed to expose them to highly confidential aspects of
IBM’s business with which they would otherwise not be familiar based on their
primary job responsibilities.”293 It added that this access was provided “with a view
to broadening their understanding of the company and the most important issues,
strategic choices, and competitive challenges it faces.”294 The logical conclusion is
that, if the employee’s knowledge was managed to combine with others within the
organization, this might be yet another factor upon which the courts can rely to
infer organizational learning.
As illustrated by this case, employee knowledge that has been coordinated with
organizational knowledge is evaluated in practice by the courts under a higher
standard in noncompete cases. For example, courts have held managers and senior
executives to a somewhat higher standard in noncompete disputes, often coming

287. See Kogut & Zander, supra note 192.
288. Id. at 389.
289. See generally Michael A. Campion, Lisa Cheraskin & Michael J. Stevens, CareerRelated Antecedents and Outcomes of Job Rotation, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1518 (1994).
290. See Justin J.P. Jansen, Frans A.J. Van den Bosch & Henk W. Volberda, Managing
Potential and Realized Absorptive Capacity: How Do Organizational Antecedents Matter?,
48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 999, 1000 (2005).
291. IBM Corp. v. Papermaster, No. 08-CV-9078, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95516
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008).
292. Declaration of J. Randall MacDonald at 2, Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v.
Papermaster, No. 08-cv-9078 (KMK), 2008 WL 4974508 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008).
293. Id.
294. Id.
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out in favor of the former employer.295 This may be in part because the court
believes that senior managers are exposed to sensitive company information.
However, another justification for this exists from the perspective of the resourcebased theory. That justification exists because senior business people are often
involved in managing knowledge among various individuals and often derive
confidential knowledge that is socially complex, as illustrated in the prior
examples.
If social complexity exists, the judge may then determine as a matter of law that
the firm has established a legitimate claim to the former employee’s knowledge. In
other words, there is a protectable interest at issue. In that case, the judge would be
amenable to enforcing the noncompete as a threshold matter, subject to the
additional inquiry concerning whether or not the asserted provision is unreasonable
in light of precedent or evolving industry conditions.
At this point, a noncompete analysis based on the resource-based theory
provides a more principled and analytically rigorous method to determine, at the
threshold level, the legitimacy of a firm’s claim to the departing employee’s
knowledge. The analytical approach provided here can help the courts efficiently
separate, at the earliest stages of litigation, those claims that are legitimate from
those that are not. The noncompete, however, may still reach too far, even if the
firm persuades the court that it has a legitimate business claim to the former
employee’s knowledge. The analysis using the resource-based theory, however,
helps to reduce the blunt impact of the noncompete as an overly broad,
unprincipled mechanism that may harmfully restrict knowledge flows by restricting
employee mobility, especially in the hands of an employer who wields
disproportionate bargaining power or resources.
Nonetheless, the courts would still be able to assess whether the noncompete is
reasonably limited in time and space and consonant with the public interest. This
determination is straightforward if the employer has a legitimate claim to
knowledge as assessed by the framework offered here, and it is also straightforward
if the departing employee made no substantial contribution to developing that
knowledge.296 In that case, the judge would find that the employer’s interest to the
knowledge is sound, and award the employer’s request for an equitable remedy
consisting of a preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, or permanent
injunction if appropriate.
The resource-based theory approach to noncompetes is consonant with the law
of equitable remedies. One of the factors that courts use to evaluate whether to
grant the injunction is the irreparable harm that the plaintiff would suffer absent the
remedy.297 An irreparable harm is usually used to define an asset that cannot be
easily replaced or substituted in the marketplace, for example, goodwill, customer
relationships, and trade secrets. Likewise, employee knowledge that is a resource is

295. For a discussion of the skepticism with which courts traditionally viewed
noncompetes and the transition to a more enforcement friendly reasonableness approach, see
Stone, supra note 28, at 741.
296. See supra Figure 1 (scenario B).
297. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic
Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 389–90 (2005).
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knowledge that cannot be easily substituted or that would cause irreparable injury if
replicated by a competitor.
B. Assessing Reasonableness in Cases of Disputed Knowledge
Admittedly, the more difficult cases arise when both the employer and former
employee have legitimate competing claims to knowledge.298 In these cases, the
court would still assess the reasonableness of the covenant’s specific language. The
courts are empowered in cases involving public policy299 to determine the
reasonableness of noncompete terms. This reasonableness determination, in most
states, is a question of law and it is squarely within the courts’ adjudicatory power
in these jurisdictions to rewrite unreasonable terms in employment contracts that
are held to violate public policy.300 However, within this proposed framework the
important issue of knowledge ownership is explicitly considered by the courts to
act as a filter for what information disputes are significant enough to be considered
under the reasonableness test.
Some factors that the courts often use to weigh the reasonableness of terms and
to balance the interests of both parties include whether the covenant is a blanket
restriction against employment by any competitor,301 whether the former employee
will inevitably use or disclose the knowledge in their new employment,302 whether
there are any unique industry conditions,303 whether intellectual property was used

298. See supra Figure 1 (scenario D).
299. Courts are empowered to limit or rewrite private contracts for various public policy
reasons. For example, one equity-based public policy justification involves the doctrine of
unconscionability. See DiMatteo, supra note 14, at 766–67.
300. For an analysis of the trends related to “blue pencil” rewriting of a noncompete, see
generally Bishara, supra note 91, at 776–79.
301. For example, a broadly drafted covenant might read: “I agree that for a period of one
(1) year following termination of my employment, I will not become an employee, or in any
way engage in or contribute my knowledge to a competitor.” A covenant such as this one
may be unduly broad since the former employee may never use the knowledge gained in
their prior employment to the disadvantage of the former employer. For example, the
employee may join the ranks of a competitor, yet work in a different business area or
division. See ANSYS, Inc. v. Computational Dynamics N. Am., Ltd., 595 F.3d 75, 78 (1st
Cir. 2010)
302. Some jurisdictions, for example, uphold the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. See
Hyde, supra note 12, at 9 (criticizing New Jersey for a lack of venture capital or a culture or
infrastructure of start-ups and pointing out that the state “vigorously enforces noncompetes
and is one of perhaps three states in which employers may enjoin a departing employee from
taking a job on the grounds that he or she will ‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade
secret”). Under this doctrine, an employer may restrict a former employee from joining a
competitor if disclosure of confidential information would be inevitable in that new
employment setting.
303. See EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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to help secure the knowledge,304 and whether the employee engaged in any
unethical behavior.305
The approach advanced up to this point may be criticized by some as an
example of undue interference with the important principle of freedom of
contract.306 From this perspective, the argument often made is that the employee
and employer willfully bargained for the noncompete agreement terms, suggesting
that this agreement should not be set aside as a general matter. The approach
advocated here does, to some extent, limit the freedom of contract principle.
Freedom of contract, however, is not unlimited.307 In the noncompete context, the
courts and legislatures have already limited the freedom of contract principle as a
policy matter with their explicit adoption of the reasonableness and balancing tests.
The resource-based approach described in this Article simply provides a more
principled and rigorous application of the existing policies that are meant to restrict
overreaching contract terms.
CONCLUSION
Surprisingly, the resource-based theory has yet to be fully appreciated in legal
scholarship.308 There are, however, clear strategic benefits to applying this theory to
noncompete enforcement policy. First, the resource-based theory helps explain and
justify the courts’ decision-making process related to noncompete enforcement in
terms of legitimately protectable interests and balancing stakeholder rights.
Second, as presented in this article, the resource-based theory offers a modern
and principled analysis of noncompetes that recognizes the importance of both
knowledge ownership and spillovers in an increasingly complex and fluid business
environment. As the decision-making model presented above demonstrates, the
resource-based theory gives the courts a new analytical tool and a robust theoretical
justification for critically interpreting noncompetes in a world where human capital
and knowledge are crucial elements necessary to achieve growth and sustainable
competitive advantage.

304. Frequently, noncompete cases are litigated along with claims of trade secret
infringement. See Stone, supra note 38, at 583–85.
305. There are cases when an employee “poaches” or “raids” other employees,
encouraging them to depart the firm as a group. If these additional employees contributed
explicit, private, asset-specific knowledge, they individually have a claim to the knowledge.
However, the firm has a competing legitimate interest since the knowledge shared by these
individuals is likely to be organizational and socially complex knowledge, since it was
shared amongst several employees. This action may be prevented with a separate nonsolicitation clause. From the perspective of the resource-based theory of knowledge,
however, a raid on employee talent may unfairly deprive the firm of organizational
knowledge that has all the VRIN properties.
306. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1975).
307. For example, the unconscionability doctrine limits freedom to contract. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
308. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Third, the resource-based theory provides support for analyzing noncompetes
from a public interest perspective that has not been fully explored by the courts or
scholars. The model presented in this article provides a tool that empowers courts
and state policymakers to reconcile the ideals of knowledge ownership, transfer,
and development while encouraging human capital investments. The model
provides a dependable rationale for allocating knowledge ownership rights and
furthers business and knowledge development, while recognizing the rights of
employees and the benefits of permissible knowledge spillovers due to increasing
employee mobility.
If the framework advanced here takes root and is used by policy makers and
courts to regulate the use of noncompetes, the model’s analytical clarity will reduce
some of the uncertainty currently plaguing this important area of the law.
Ultimately, if more predictability and consistent enforcement levels can be
achieved, then this updated approach towards the role of noncompetes will have a
positive influence on contract formation, negotiations, and knowledge-management
practices. This will ultimately lead to a decrease in employer overreaching and an
overall improved climate for investment in human capital and knowledge-based
assets.

